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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Court of Appeals Case No. 20140602-CA
District Court Case No. 131902542
Juvenile Court Case No. 1003447

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

COOPERJOHN ANTHONY VAN
HUIZEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

TURISDICTION

~

Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(c) and (e) provide the Court's jurisdiction over
~

0

appeals from Serious Youth Offender bindover orders and second degree felony
convictions.
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
Cooper brings his claims under the ineffective assistance of counsei plain error, and
exceptional circumstances doctrines. The instances of error meriting relief under those
doctrines include:
1. counsel's ineffective assistance during the Serious Youth Offender preliminary
hearing;
2. the juvenile court's misinterpretation of the 2013 amended version of the Serious
Youth Offender statute; and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3. the juvenile court judge's failure to disqualify herself from presiding over Cooper's
Serious Youth Offender preliminary hearing despite being married to the Chief Deputy of
the Criminal Division of the office prosecuting Cooper, and fonnerly working in that office
in the same position as Cooper's juvenile court prosecutor.
Cooper invokes the cumulative error doctrine. This involves consideration of all
identified and assumed errors, and requires reversal if the errors undennine confidence in
the fairness of the proceedings. See,~ State v. Bair, 2012 UT App 106, ,I 13, 275 P.3d
1050.
It appears that the juvenile court's ruling on the bindover order satisfies the
preservation requirements for appeal from that ruling, see State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, ,I
13, 61 P.3d 1062 (issues are preserved for appeal ruled upon), and that challenges to such
rulings are properly initiated on appeal, see,~ State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 318, ,r,i 27-35,

79 P.3d 951 (correcting juvenile court's errors in Serious Youth Offender bindover order
without discussing preservation). The claims were raised in district court in post-sentence
motions (R. 80-99, 110-112, 219-235, 414-456, 472-92, 508-524). The district court refused
to hold a hearing or reach the merits of the claims (R. 464-65, 586-98). In denying a
certificate of probable cause, the district court opined that Cooper's claims were not
reasonably likely to result in reversal (R. 595-96).
Juvenile court bindover applications of law to facts are granted limited deference on
appeal. E.g., State v. I.RC., 2010 UT 41, ,I ,I 12,232 P.3d 1040.
This Court will address claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that were not ruled
2
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on below as matters of law, without deference to the lower courts. E.g., State v. Ellifritz,
835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992). To establish ineffective assistance, Cooper must
specify acts or omissions that were objectively unreasonable. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687-88, 690 (1984). He must overcome the presumption that counsel's strategies
were "within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689.
The plain error doctrine requires proof of an obvious and prejudicial error, and
provides relief from less obvious but highly prejudicial errors. See,

~ State

v. Eldredge,

773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
To show prejudice under both doctrines, Cooper must show a reasonable likelihood
of a different result in the absence of the error. See, ~ State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124
n.15 (Utah 1989); Strickland at 687.
The Court corrects rare procedural anomalies otherwise resulting in miscarriages of
justice with the exceptional circumstances doctrine. E.g., State v. Lopez, 873 P .2d 1127,
1134 n.2 (Utah 1994).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The _addendum contains copies of the relevant provisions.

3
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
The State charged Cooper under the Serious Youth Offender Act with two counts of
aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated burglary, relying on a theory of accomplice
liability 0.C.R. 2-3). The juvenile court found probable cause to bind over the charges, and
transferred Cooper and the case to the adult court (R. 370-75;).C.R. 24-25, 28-31).
Cooper and his parents retained substitute trial counsel and asked him to appeal from
the juvenile court's order, as they wanted Cooper to stay in the juvenile court (R. 114, 118,
122). Substitute trial counsel misinformed them that the time for appeal had run before he
took the case, and he forfeited Cooper's appeal of right provided by § 78a-6-704 (R. 114,
116-18, 123). Counsel advised Cooper to plead guilty to two second-degree-felonies in adult
court, leading Cooper and his parents to share counsel's belief that Cooper could not go to
prison ifhe performed flawlessly on probation (R. 116-117). On May 7, 2014, the court sent
Cooper to prison on two concurrent terms of one to fifteen years (R. 8).
In trying to keep Cooper safe, the warden first placed Cooper in solitary confinement
in the portion of the prison housing death row inmates and dangerous mentally ill offenders

(R. 114-115). He was left in his cell under camera surveillance for up to 72 hours straight,
and was not allowed to see his parents (R. 114-115). He was later moved to the Daggett
County Jail, approximately three hours away from his parents and counsel, where he was in
direct contact with adult offenders (R. 224). Cooper maintained good behavior (R. 411
n.17).
4
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~

Through present counsel, Cooper began filing post-sentence motions to reinstate his
defaulted appeal from the juvenile court's Serious Youth Offender bindover order (R. 93-99,
472-92), to vacate his sentence (R. 80-92, 219-227), to declare his pleas mispleas or nullify
them (R. 110-112, 228-235), to quash the juvenile court bindover order (R. 414-456, 508524), and for a certificate of probable cause (R. 547-63, 576-85). The district court
acknowledged Cooper's requests for evidenti.ary and oral argument hearings, and refused to
have a hearing of any kind (R. 464-65). The court reinstated Cooper's direct appeal from the
Serious Youth Offender bindover order, and denied all other relief (R. 586-98, 612-13).
Cooper appealed(~ R. 545-46, 599-602, 618-623).
The Board of Pardons paroled Cooper on November 6, 2014, and this Court
dismissed Cooper's petition for a certificate of probable cause as moot on Cooper's motion.
RELEVANT FACTS
Cooper Van Huizen was sixteen at the time of the crime, pleas and sentence

W.. 20).

He had no prior history of juvenile or adult offenses and lost approximately twenty-five
pounds over the pendency of his case (R. 68-69).
Cooper was the youngest of the defendants and next to the smallest defendant
charged in the burglary and robberies. Cooper was 16 years 4 months old, 5'11" tall and
weighed 150 pounds (R. 160). Wesley Brown was 18 years 10 months old, 6'2" tall, and
weighed 217 pounds (R. 165-66). Dexter Skinner was 18 years 4 months old, 6' tall, and
weighed 185 pounds (R. 163-64). Tomek Perkins was 18 years 9 months eighteen years old,

5
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5'6" tall, and weighed 120 pounds R. 162). Joshua Dutson was 17 years 2 months old, 6' tall,
and weighed 160 pounds (R. 161).
Prior to the crimes, Cooper was friends with Joshua Dutson and was acquainted with
Dexter Skinner, but did not know Wesley Brown and Tomek Perkins (R. 293). Dexter
Skinner had moved in with Joshua Dutson's family for about a month in approximately
August of 2013, when Joshua's mother was trying to save Dexter from his troubled lifestyle

(R. 326). Dexter called her "mom" and Joshua looked up to Dexter as a male role model
and the older brother he had always wanted (R. 327). When Joshua became close to Dexter,
Joshua became distant from his family, started sleeping more, and seemed less happy and
energetic (R. 328). Joshua's mother asked Dexter to leave because he wanted to use illegal

drugs and was doing the wrong things to earn money that he could not earn with a regular
job (R. 327). Cooper was with Dexter and Joshua when he tried smoking marijuana the first
time (R. 30).

The day before the robbery,Joshua Dutson texted Cooper and infonned him he was
''high" (R. 488). The agreedto "chill" the next day (R. 446). Joshua suggested they would go
to Dexter's and smoke marijuana (R. 445-47). Joshua offered to pay for gas and asked if they
would take his car, and Cooper said it depended on what his dad drives, and asked if Dexter
had marijuana (R. 447). Joshua told Cooper that Dexter was "re-upping" the next day and
asked Cooper what would happen if all that was left was the Mustang (R. 447).

6
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Then Joshua said, "Rob some niggas Hahahahah no what I'm saying? Want in you'll
get a cut of it? hahahahah" (R. 447). 1 Cooper responded, "Then we take that. But yeah I'll
l.d

do that for sure I just gotta get my gun back from Andrew." (R. 447). Joshua responded,
''That's hella chill nigga but I was kidding." (R. 447). Then Joshua said, ''I'm mot." ''Not."

(R. 448). Cooper responded, ''Not what? Ha ur confusing the shit outa me" (R. 448).
Joshua responded, "Im high hahaHaha you can be apart of it but you gotta keep it on the
down low .. an trust no nigga." (R. 448). Cooper responded, "About what? Robbing or
~

driving the Mustang?" (R. 449). Then Cooper said, ''I know I'm not dumb ha haaha!" (R.

449).
Joshua was simultaneously scheming with Dexter Skinner in a separate text message
conversation about Cooper wanting to participate in robbing, and Dexter responded,
''Tomorrow we grab them straps and hit up niggas." (R. 448, 450). The "straps" to which
Dexter referred were apparently Cooper's father's guns.
A detective conceded that the actual robbery was planned by Wesley Brown the day
after the text conversations, and that Wesley was not part of the text conversations (R. 307).
Wesley Brown made the plan to rob Christian Davidson, as Wesley had lived with Christian
in the past and knew Christian would have drugs (R. 282-83, 306).2

1 Exhibit 1 is a truncated version of the text conversations admitted in the
preliminary hearing, which began with the foregoing statement.
2 The detective paraphrased Joshua Dutson's statement to the police, first indicating
that "t:lie}flm¼ HuimdlyerpaompHmis~ps~3J3B.):sdmlt ~itl:Jepnlit:e~§l:fiml)til:~
that "they all basically made this plan," (R. 282). But when asked ifJoshua said "they" made
7
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Cooper showed up on the day of the robbery without guns. Sometime after Tomek
Perkins picked up and drove Cooper to join the group, they all went back to Cooper's home
to get Cooper's father's guns (R. 288, 295).
Christian Davidson testified that on the night of the robbery, he was in the basement
with his friend Ryan Golding while his mother was upstairs (R. 246, 248). He was expecting
friends and went to the back door when he heard a loud knock (R. 247). He said he opened
the door slightly, and Dexter Skinner put his foot in the door, blocking Christian from
closing it, and declared, ''We're coming in," or "Open the door or I'm going to pop
[inaudible]." (R. 247,260). Christian claimed Dexter had a revolver out and was holding it
by the side of his body (R. 247).
Christian believed that Dexter came in with two other people (R. 247). Christian
initially identified Cooper in court as the third person who came in with Wesley and Dexter

(R. 253), and prior to the hearing had selected Cooper's photo from an array and told the
police that Cooper was the one who held a gun pointed at the ground and took his wallet
and phone off the counter during the robbery (R. 310). But later in the preliminary he~g,
Christian was uncertain that Cooper was the third person (R. 257), and testified that he _did
not see which person took his wallet and phone at Dexter's command (R. 254-56).
The juvenile court found that Cooper did not carry a gun (R. 372). The police later
confirmed that there were three people who came in with Dexter Skinner - Wesley Brown,

the plan, the detective clarified that Joshua told the police that ''Wesley created the plan." (R.
283).
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Joshua Dutson, and Cooper, while Tomek Perkins was the getaway driver (R. 276). Joshua
Dutson was the third gunman along with Dexter and Wesley, by Joshua's own admission (R.
~

284,289). The gun used by Joshua was a CO2 powered bb or pellet revolver that had the
weight and appearance of a real gun (R. 302-03). The police believed Tomek Perkins
provided Joshua's gun (R. 301-02). None of the guns was loaded (R. 284,296,662).
Christian said that they entered against his will and went downstairs as he told them
his mother was the only other person home (R. 248, 261 ). Christian said that Dexter put his
pistol away when Ryan Golding came out of the laundry room, but that Dexter then lifted
his shirt and showed Ryan the butt of his gun (R. 249-251). Ryan said, "Oh, that's neat,"
and reached toward the gun (R. 251 ).
Christian then wamed him, ''Dude, you don't want to touch that." (R. 251). When
Ryan asked why, Christian told him he never wanted to touch someone else's weapon (R.
252). Christian said that Dexter chimed in, "'Yeah, man, his body is on this."' (R. 252).
Christian said he got very nervous and scared after that, as "it really doesn't take one to
know one if a gun's getting pulled out in anyone's home, it's really no two cents that lives
may be in danger." (R. 252).
Dexter pointed his gun, a large revolver, at Christian's face and someone told
Christian to give him everything (R. 252-53). 3 Christian hesitated and laughed, asking,
"Seriously, over pot?" Wesley and the third person pulled out their revolvers (R. 252-53,

3 Christian repeatedly testified in passive voice, and no one asked him to clarify.
9
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59). Christian was told to lie on the floor, and he said there was a "little tiny bag of weed on
the table. That's all I have." (R. 254).
Dexter corrected him, ''No, you don't. I saw what you slipped in your pocket," and
Christian then pulled a bag of marijuana out of his pocket (R. 254). Dexter asked if he had
any money and Christian said he did not, although he had fifty dollars in his wallet, and
Dexter told someone to grab Christian's wallet and phone but Christian did not see who
took them (R. 254-56). Someone told him to lie still on the floor, and Wesley said he was

going upstairs to pay Christian's mother a visit and the other two rushed upstairs and out the
door (R. 255). Before Wesley went upstairs, Wesley complained of Christian's having
awakened him with a metal pole on another occasion, and Christian told him he was fairly
sure that Wesley had previously beaten up Christian the night his chin was broken open (R.
255). Wesley pointed his gun at Christian for a second and hesitated, and Christian thought
he was about to get shot (R. 255). But Wesley went upstairs quickly (R. 255). Christian
commented to Ryan, ''Whoa dude, that was insane." (R. 256). About nine seconds later he
heard the back door shut, and thought it was Wesley leaving (R. 256).
After Christian's mother inquired at the school regarding Wesley Brown, the police
were called, but Christian and Ryan hid from them in the back yard (R. 263-64). Ryan
Golding did not testify, but his 1102 statement was read into the record. It stated,
Early today my Christian and I were robbed at gunpoint. I was in the laundry
- in his laundry room downstairs when a lot -- about five to six guys I had never
seen before[4] came down, and one guy was show me a gun when - when another
4 Ryan was actually able to identify Wesley because Christian and his mother knew
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pulled his gun out and pointed it at all of us - or at us. He told us to get on the
ground and to hand over our phones and money. I gave him the money in my wallet,
and they proceeded to leave while threatening to kill us if we tried to stop him or tell
anyone about it.

(R. 264-65).
A police officer testified that Joshua Dutson told the police that Wesley Brown

·~

devised the plan to rob Christian of his marijuana and heroin and they all agreed to it before
leaving the home in Ogden (R. 282-83, 288). Joshua said everyone had a role, and Joshua
origioal1y claimed that Cooper had a gun during the robbery (R. 286). Then he said that
Cooper supplied two real guns and a switchblade that he thought Cooper carried but did not
pull out the during the robbery (R. 285). The juvenile court found that Cooper did not carry
a gun and that there was insufficient evidence that he had a switchblade (R. 372).
Joshua admitted to pulling the CO2 gun during the robbery, but he said he hdd it
pointed toward the ground (R. 284). Joshua said they got seven grams of marijuana during
the robbery and took it back to Ogden and smoked it before Tomek drove Cooper and the
guns home and took Wesley back to the Two Rivers (alternative) High School (R. 288-89).
The police went to Cooper's home, and Cooper and his father, Marc, were
cooperative. Marc showed the police his safe, where the guns used by Dexter and Wesley
were (R. 290-91). In Cooper's room, the police found a pellet gun that was not used in the
robbery, foil that had been used to smoke marijuana, and a bottle of beer (R. 292).

Wesley, and Ryan also recognized Dexter from when they had been in detention together (R.
279).
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In his police station interview, Cooper told essentially the same version of events as
Joshua, except they differed about when Wesley went upstairs to see Christian's mother (R.
294). Cooper said they were conversing with Christian when Dexter pulled the gun on him
and told him they were robbing him of his marijuana, and that Wesley and Dexter held
Christian and Ryan at gunpoint (R. 295). He denied seeing Joshua's gun, even after the
police informed him that Joshua had admitted to using it (R. 295). Cooper refused to name
Wesley Brown as a participant until the police told him everyone else had already named
Wesley (R. 292).
Cooper admitted that his father's guns were used in the robbery (R. 296). Cooper
told the police that he took the guns with the understanding they were going target shooting

(R. 295-96). He said that Dexter had texted him the morning of the robbery and invited him
to hang out, and that Tomek picked up Cooper and took him to the house (R. 295). Dexter
asked him if he wanted to go shooting in Morgan, and Cooper told him he had a couple of
guns so they went to Cooper's house and got the guns (R. 295). When the detective asked
about the gun that was missing a firing pin and did not work, Cooper said he was not aware
of that when they took the guns (R. 296).
Joshua's phone also contained text messages between him and Cooper the day after
the robbery, wherein they joked about Joshua and the others committing another robbery

(R. 271-72; Exhibit 1). An officer testified that on Cooper's phone, the police found texts
that were consistent with those taken from Joshua's phone and a video of an unknown male
lining up and snorting white powder (R. 266-67, 305).
12
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After the juvenile court found probable cause that the crimes had been committed, in
the retention portion of the Serious Youth Offender preliminary hearing, evidence was
presented that Joshua Dutson was involved with his mother in trading and acquiring Lortab
and Valium, apparently outside of their prescriptions (R. 323-337).
Cooper's parents both attested to Cooper's being a well-behaved, talented,
hardworking and beloved child who had difficulty learning but still worked hard in school

(R. 345-351, 353-54). His mother described Cooper's missing and falling behind in school,
growing distant, and finding new friends who did not come around his parents after
Cooper's best friend had moved away a few months prior to the robbery (R. 351-53).
SUM1v.lARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
As Cooper has already served his prison sentence in the adult system, his appeal is
focused on the juvenile court proceedings and defective bindover order, which failed to
provide valid jurisdiction in the adult court. His goal in pursuing this appeal is to return to
the juvenile court.
Trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient, as counsel failed to inform the
juvenile court about the 2013 amendments to the Serious Youth Offender statute, and failed
to investigate, prepare for and advocate properly in Cooper's preliminary hearing. His
omissions were not strategic. There is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result in
the absence of counsel's objectively deficient performance.
In addition to being at a disadvantage due to trial counsel's failure to advocate for
Cooper, the juvenile court misinterpreted the Serious Youth Offender statute, by failing to
13
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compare the culpability of the defendants and by holding Cooper accountable for the actions
of the other defendants, rather than focusing on his role. The court apparently applied the
outdated law that public safety is served by placing juveniles in the adult system, and focused
on hypothetical possibilities common to most if not all Serious Youth Offender charges in
assessing the public safety factor. The court did not independently weigh Cooper's lack of a
prior weapons offense and Cooper's lack of any juvenile history. There is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result in the absence of these plain errors, to which counsel
should have objected. Exceptional circumstances justify relief.
The juvenile court judge should have disqualified herself from presiding over
Cooper's case when she was married to the Chief Deputy over the Criminal Division of the
Weber County Attorney's Office, which was prosecuting Cooper, and had formerly worked
in that office in the same position as Cooper's juvenile court prosecutor. This gave rise to
the appearance of impropriety and requires reversal under numerous provisions of law.
Individually and cumulatively, the errors justify an opinion reversing the bindover
order, vacating the convictions and pleas, and remanding this case to the juvenile court.
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ARGUMENTS

I.

Cooper Received Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel At The Serious Youth
Offender Preliminary Hearing.
A.

Effective Assistance of Counsel is Essential in Serious Youth Offender
Proceedings.

Juveniles such as Cooper are entitled to effective assistance of counsel in Serious
Youth Offender preliminary hearings. Houskeeper v. State, 2008 UT 78, ffll 38-40, 197 P.3d
636. In State v. AngjlaIJ, 2011 UT 3, 245 P.3d 745, the court recognized that when juveniles
are statutorily within the juvenile court's original jurisdiction, they have a liberty interest in
remaining there. Id. at

,,r 13-19.

Given that children prosecuted in adult court may be

housed in adult facilities, life may also be at stake. See,~ Katz Levi, "State v. Mohl: State
Sanctioned Abuse," 10 Journal of Law and Family Studies 173, 174-76 and accompanying
~

notes (2007) (explaining how incarcerating children in adult jails endangers children, and
increases the risk of suicide). When there is life or a liberty interest at stake, due process of
law, guaranteed by Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, requires courts to afford defendants the full
panoply of procedural rights. Christiansen v. Harris, 1563 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). It is
vital that counsel ensure that the juveniles' rights are fully effectuated and protected during
Serious Youth Offender proceedings, so that the adversarial system functions properly and
produces reliable results. See,~ United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,658 (1984)
(discussing the basic role of counsel contemplated by the Sixth Amendment).
15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B.

Counsel was Ineffective in Failing to Inform The Court About The
2013 Amendments To The Serious Youth Offender Statute.

By reviewing the enrolled copy of the bill embodying the 2013 amendments to the
Serious Youth Offender Act, in the addendum, the Court will appreciate the significant
changes in the law that were enacted shortly before Cooper's Serious Youth Offender
preliminary hearing. Prior to the May 2013 amendments, our juvenile courts had very little
discretion to retain minors under the Serious Youth Offender statute. Juveniles bore a
"heavy burden" to overcome the presumption that they would transfer to the adult court,
and had to show by clear and convincing evidence all of the retention factors: that they were
less culpable than co-perpetrators, that their role in the offense was not violent, aggressive or
premeditated, and that they had no prior delinquency involving a weapon that would have
been a felony offense if an adult had committed it. E.g., § 78A-6-702(3)(b) and (c) (2012);
State v. F.L.R, 2006 UT App 294, ,I,I3 and 4, 141 P.3d 601. Importantly, the rationale
behind the pre-2013 version of the Serious Youth Offender statute was that public safety
was served by sending young offenders into the adult system, despite the fact that juveniles
might benefit from the rehabilitative services of the juvenile court. M.E.P. v. State, 2005 UT
App 227,

,r 14 n. 4, 114 P.3d 596; State ex rel. A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1098-99 (Utah App.

1997). Under the pre-2013 version of the statute, courts were not to consider whether
juveniles were amenable to rehabilitation. See A.B., supra, at 1098.
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Under the 2013 amended statute, juvenile courts have discretion to retain
juveniles, based on an ultimate assessment of the juveniles' and the public's interest in
the juveniles' remaining in juvenile court. Juveniles no longer bear the burden to
prove by clear and convincing evidence all of the subsidiary considerations -- that
they had no prior weapons-related adjudications, that their relative culpability was
lower than their co-perpetrators, and that their roles in the offenses were not violent,
premeditated and aggressive. Rather, these factors are considered to the degree they
may be present, along with the juveniles' prior history or lack thereof in the juvenile
courts, and whether retaining them in juvenile court better serves the public safety
interest than sending them into the adult system. See 78A-6-702(3) (2013).
Considerations such as the juveniles' amenability to treatment, risk of re-offense, and
availability of developmentally appropriate treatment in the juvenile system are now
subject to consideration under the amended statute, which factors in whether the
public's interest in safety and general interests and the minor's interests are best
served by retaining the minors in juvenile court.
The rationale for the amendments is found in the legislative history for House Bill
105 from the 2013 general session. The history confinns that the statute was amended to
increase the discretion of juvenile court judges to retain Serious Youth Offender juveniles,
and to decrease the burden on juveniles in the retention phase of preliminary hearings, and
thereby reduce the number of juveniles who were being transferred into the adult system
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without first exhausting the resources of the juvenile system, in order to serve the best
interests of both juveniles and the public. See
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip id =2796&meta id=7 6536,
(testimony of Jacey Skinner, Director of the Utah Sentencing Commission, before the House
Standing Judiciary on February 22, 2013;
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip id=2864&meta id=78203 (floor
debate commentary by bill sponsor, Representative Lowry Snow); and
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip id= 3146&meta id =85441 (floor
debate commentary by Senator Lyle Hillyard), all transcribed in the addendum. The
amendments were made to account for the fact that juveniles who are sent into the adult
system are frequently released from adult confinement relatively quickly without
rehabilitative intervention and resources, and tend to recidivate more frequently and more
violently than those retained in the juvenile system. Thus, contrary to reasoning in prior law,
~

M.E.P. and A.B., supra, the legislature recognized that public safety interests coincide

with the juveniles' interests in retaining juveniles in the juvenile courts, where they have the
benefits of rehabilitative services provided therein. See id. 5

5 Multiple studies prove that transferring juveniles into the adult system disserves the
interests of the public in safety and the interests of the minors. In the adult system, minors
do not receive the benefits of the age-appropriate rehabilitative services available in juvenile
court, and are often released early without effective intervention. This, coupled with the
housing of impressionable and developing minors with adult offenders, and the stigmatizing
effect of adult prosecution, results in increased recidivism, particularly violent recidivism,
among juvenile offenders in the adult system, as compared to those who remain in the
juvenile system. See,~ ''Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency"
18
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Trial counsel did not assert the law and infonn the juvenile court that the 2013
amendments to the Serious Youth Offender statutes were enacted expressly to ensure that
1.1

more first time offenders such as Cooper would be retained in the juvenile court, as the
public safety interest and interests of the juveniles are both served by retaining most
juveniles who have not yet had the benefit of juvenile court resources in the juvenile court
system. It was incumbent on counsel to research the change in the law and advocate for
Cooper, ~ Strickland, supra, and it was objectively deficient for counsel to fail to advocate
the amendments in the law on Cooper's behalf, compare Moritzsky, supra (counsel's failure
to assert amended law reflected in "pocket part'' to code book constituted ineffective
assistance). There is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had the court been
fully informed about the 2013 amendments to the Serious Youth Offender statute.

C.

Counsel Was Ineffective In Failing To Present Expert Testimony
And/Or Studies And Law Justifying Cooper's Retention In The
Juvenile System.

In Houskeeper, supra, the court found that counsel was objectively deficient in failing
to investigate and present expert testimony to the effect that the aggravated sexual assault

by Richard Redding in the OJJDP bulletin (2008)
Q:ittps://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1 / ojjdp/220595.pdf); "Different from Adults: An Updated
Analysis of Juvenile Transfer and Blended Sentencing Law, With Recommendations for
Reform" by the National Center for Juvenile Justice (Nov 2008)
Q:ittp://www.ncjj.org/PDF/MFC/MFC Transfer 2008.pdf): "Transfer of Juveniles to
Adult Court: Effects of a Broad Policy in One Court" by Edward Mulvey and Carol
Schubert, OJJDP Juvenile Justice Bulletin December 2012
(http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/232932.pdf); and ''The Effectiveness of Declining Juvenile
Court Jurisdiction," Washington State Institute for Public Policy, December 2013.
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bound over from the preliminary hearing was not violent or aggressive, id, and that
Houskeeper was prejudiced by this, given that the jury who heard the appropriate expert
testimony at trial convicted him only of attempted rape. Id. at ,r,r 41-51. The court found
prejudice even though Houskeeper did not challenge the fairness of the trial he had in adult
court, wherein he was convicted of a lesser offense than he may have been found delinquent
for in juvenile court. In finding prejudice, the court recognized that the juvenile court
adjudications would have been subject to expungement, whereas the adult conviction was
not, and that in the juvenile system, Houskeeper's best interests would have been the focus
of the proceedings, and he would have been eligible for the rehabilitative services of the
juvenile system. Id.
Cooper's counsel similarly failed to prepare for the Serious Youth Offender
proceedings, and prejudiced Cooper with this objectively deficient perfonnance. Under the
2013 amended statute, the retention inquiry was defined by subsections (3)(b) and (c) of
78A-6-702.
As Cooper had no prior weapons-related offenses and no prior adjudications in the
juvenile court, both of these factors should have weighed separately and heavily in favor of
his retention. See §78A-6-702(3)(i) and (iv) (2013).
As to whether public safety was better served by retaining Cooper in the juvenile
system, see §78A-6-702(3)(v) (2013), counsel did not present any expert testimony to aid the
juvenile court judge in assessing Cooper's stage of development, intellectual and emotional
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functioning, relative lack of culpability and relatively unpremeditated role in the offense, low
risk of re-offense, and amenability to reform in the juvenile system.
~

The results of psychological testing conducted by Dr. Matt Davies after Cooper was
sent to prison and then transferred to the Daggett County Jail reflect that Cooper scores as
naive and unsophisticated, a rule follower, rather than a rule breaker, lacking a history of
impulsive or aggressive behavior, and appropriately empathetic and responsive to others'
feelings (R. 410). His test scores place him at a low risk for aggressive or violent behavior

4P

(R. 410). He has no elevated scores as are commonly seen with adolescents with problems
with violence, aggression, and non-compliance (R. 410). His testing shows no mental illness,
although he may be delayed in his ability to identify and express his feelings consistently (R.
410).
He recognized the need to make amends for his criminal behavior, understood the
impact of his and his co-perpetrators' conduct on the victims, and wished that the crimes
had never happened (R. 411). The evaluation explained that because of Cooper's age and
possible mild developmental immaturity, he did not have a completely developed capacity to

think through and anticipate consequences of his own actions (R. 412). In discussing the
crime during the evaluation, Cooper's viewpoint was that he did not plan it, and when he
found out what Wesley and Dexter planned to do, he knew it was wrong but did not know
what to do (R. 411). While Cooper recognized in hindsight that he could have derailed the
crime, his test data suggested that at the time of the offense, he did not have the emotional
wherewithal to intercede (R. 412-413). The evaluation noted studies showing that regions of
21
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the brain necessary to cognitive control are not yet developed in adolescents, and that social
context heavily influences decision-making in adolescents, who are more prone to take risks
to gain peer approval (R. 412 and n.21).
The evaluation addressed Cooper's and the public safety interest in his retention in
the juvenile court, explaining that juveniles incarcerated with adults are more likely to be
physically and sexually abused while incarcerated, a higher incidence of mental illness, and
are 7. 7 times more likely to commit suicide than juveniles held in juvenile facilities. When
released from adult facilities, such juveniles have significantly increased rate of recidivism.

(R. 412). The evaluation concluded that if he were returned to the juvenile justice system,
Cooper would benefit from the resources available there, and could grow intellectually,
emotionally and physically in that less stressful environment (R. 413).
With regard to relative culpability, see §78A-6-702(3)(ii) (2013), counsel did not
provide the court the recent law recognizing that children are less culpable and deserve
greater leniency, because their brains are biologically underdeveloped and do not function
well when it comes to making decisions and gauging the impact of their actions. 6 Nor did
counsel inform the court through expert testimony or other means as to the deleterious
effects of marijuana on adolescent brains and decision-making. 7

6 E.g. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
837-40 (1988) (plurality); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 132
S.Ct. 2455.
7 See,~ National Institute on Drug Abuse, ''DrugFacts: Marijuana," found at
http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/marijuana (''These effects include

22
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

With regard to the public's interest in his remaining in the juvenile system, see §78A6-702(3)(v) (2013), counsel presented no information to the court regarding the risks posed
lJ

to minors in the adult system, and the effects of adult prosecution on their recidivism. Utah

does not comply with the Prison Rape Elimination Act standards designed to protect minors
housed in adult facilities from sexual assault (R. 224-225). See
http://ojp.gov/programs/pdfs/prea final rule.pd£. page 6. According to the findings
entered by Congress in conjunction with the enactment of PREA, juveniles housed in adult
facilities are five times more likely to be sexually assaulted than those housed in juvenile
facilities, often within the first forty-eight hours of being incarcerated. "Public Law 108-79,
September 4, 2003," Office of]uvenile and Delinquen~ Pro!fams, United States Department of
Justice, September 4, 2003, found at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW108publ79/PLAY-108publ79.pdf. Federal Prison Rape reporting law statistics show that the
Utah state prison has ranked among the least safe for inmates nationwide. 8 There have been

altered perceptions and mood, hnpaired coordination, difficulty with thinking and problem
solving, and disrupted learning and memory. Marijuana also effects brain development, and
when it is used heavily by young people, its effects on thinking and memory may last a long
time or even be permanent."); Gottlieb, "Cannabis: A Danger to the Adolescent Brain How Pediatricians Can Address Marijuana Use," found at
http: //www.mcpap.com/pdf/ Cannibis.pdf,
http://www.suntimes.com/news/metto/26886186-418/even-casual-marijuana-use-canalter-the-brain-new-study-shows.httnl#. U Sj8zo1dVU8.

8 In 2007, the Utah State Prison was listed among the eleven facilities wherein the
highest percentages of inmates experienced nonconsensual sexual contact, see Table 5 in
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svsfpri07.pdf). Current statistics on the Prison
Rape Elimination Act are not specific to each state, but are grim, showing that 9.6 percent of
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multiple homicides and other stabbings that have occurred at both Utah State Prisons. 9 And
as Dr. Davies indicated in his evaluation, juveniles who are housed with adults are 7. 7 more
likely than those housed with juveniles to commit suicide, and that juveniles housed with
adults also have much higher rates of recidivism and physical and sexual abuse than juvenile
offenders housed with juveniles. E.g. R. 412.
The warden's well-intended solution of placing juvenile prison inmates in solitary
confinement has adverse side effects such as increased rates of suicide and psychosis,
particularly for juvenile offenders. See, ~ "Alone and Afraid: Children Housed in Solitary
Confinement and Isolation in Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facilities," Gune 2014),
(https:/ /www.aclu.org/ files/ assets/Alone%20and%20Afraid%20COMPLETE%20FINAL.
pdf).
The foregoing information was key to the court's accurate assessment of the
retention factors. Counsel's failure to investigate and present the key evidence was
objectively deficient, not strategic. There is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result in the absence of counsel's omissions.

incarcerated people were sexually assaulted in our country's jails and prisons in 2012, that 7.5
percent of prison inmates were molested, whereas 1.8 percent of jail inmates were, and that
the rate of sexual assaults in prisons has increased from 4.8 percent to 7.5 percent. See
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdca12.pd£
9 See, ~ Salt Lake Tribune, "Investigators Identify Utah Prison Inmates Involved in
Fatal Fight," (detailing homicide of one inmate by another); Salt Lake Tribune,June 25,
2014, "Inmate Stabbed in Gang Fight at Utah State Prison," (detailing stabbings of two
inmates).
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D.

Counsel Was Ineffective With Regard To The Evidence Pertaining To
The Crimes.

Counsel omitted other evidence showing that Cooper was relatively less culpable and
that therefore his and the public's interests would be served by his remaining in juvenile
VJ)

court. In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated the ages of the codefendants and
argued that they were all of similar age and experience, and were operating as a peer group,
rather than as adults influencing the younger codefendants (R. 363). Counsel for Cooper
presented no evidence or argument to point out that Cooper is the youngest defendant,
smaller than all but one other defendant, and has no criminal history (R. 160-66). Nor did

v.)

counsel note that the oldest two, Wesley Brown and Dexter Skinner, had multiple felony
cases pending (161-73).
When the detective testified about Cooper's interrogation and told the judge that
Cooper initially omitted Wesley Brown from his description of the robbery but later agreed
to tell the truth (R. 292-93), counsel should have elicited the key fact missing from this
testimony - that Cooper wanted the police to agree to protect him before he was willing to
acknowledge Wesley Brown's participation (R. 427). Counsel should have introduced the
recording of or testimony concerning Dexter Skinner's comments during his arrest and in
his interrogation expressing his shock and regret that the sixteen-year-olds were getting
arrested, and that Cooper, a good kid, had been involved (R. 427).
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Counsel should have carefully compared the behavior of all the co-perpetrators for
the court, see Point II.A., infra, and reminded the court of the law recognizing that it is not
appropriate to attribute the misconduct of co-perpetrators to juvenile accomplices in
assessing the relative culpability of the juveniles or the extent to which the minor's role in
the offense was violent, aggressive and premeditated. See, ~ State v. Lara, 2003 UT App
318, 79 P.3d 951, infra.
As to the violence and aggression factors, counsel did not challenge Christian
Davidson's claim that the robbery was a home invasion robbery. Ryan told the police that
Christian let the people in (R. 239), and swore that it was after one of them was showing
Ryan his gun that the robbery began (R. 191). After the robbery, Golding counseled
Christian, "Stop bringing sketchy people over to your house," (R. 185), language that belies
the home invasion claim. Christian's mother made no claim of a forced entry or home
invasion when she conveyed Christian's allegations to the police (R. 174-78). Every
defendant who confessed to the anned robbery described the entry into the home as a
consensual entry (e.g. R. 24, 27, 189, 237-38). For instance, in his 1102 statement,Joshua
said that they went into the home of Wes's "buddy, Christian," and that it was after they
were inside that Dexter pulled his gun (R. 286). Counsel could have subpoenaed and called
these witnesses or presented their statements to the police had they refused to testify.
Christian was the only person who made claims to the effect that the robbery began
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with a forced entry. His claims about the supposed forced entry were inconsistent 10 He
testified that it was only after Dexter pulled out his gun in the basement that he got very
ti@

nervous and scared (R. 252). His sworn statement to the police describes him participating
in an amicable conversation about the propriety of touching another man's gun that
occurred in the basement before the robbery began, and acknowledges that he was laughing
and incredulous when the robbery over marijuana began (R. 184). Counsel should have
cross-examined Christian about the inconsistencies and about how Christian's forced entry

vi

claims may well have arisen from his need to engender sympathy with the police to minimize
his own criminal jeopardy for his drug dealing (R. 180-82). He asked his mother not to
report the robbery to the police for fear that he and his friends would be investigated for his
involvement in illegal drugs (R. 185). In addition to the false claim of a forced entry,
Davidson told the police his wallet contained fifty dollars (R. 185), in contrast to originally

v)

,,:;J

vJ

10 In his November 8, 2013, sworn typed "Roy City Police Department Statement of
Witness," Davidson claimed that he heard the knocking, unlocked the door, and looked out
the blind to see Dexter Skinner with his gun barrel visible, threatening to "bust a cap" if
Christian did not let him in. But Christian also claimed that the door was ajar and Dexter
had his foot in it, blocking Christian from closing it. R. 183-85. If the door had been ajar,
there would have been no need for the Dexter to knock or Christian to unlock the door.
In his separate handwritten sworn ''Roy City Written Statement'' from November 4,
2013, Christian claimed that he heard a knock, looked through the door, saw the barrel of a
gun and heard a light skinned black man say, "Open the door or I'll pop this cap." Christian
said he opened the door and was told to go downstairs. But he made no claim of trying to
close the door or the man sticking his foot in the door. R. 186-87.
In his testimony at the preliminary hearing, Davidson claimed that he opened the
door after hearing a loud knock at which point Dexter Skinner was ·holding a gun by his side
and someone said they were coming in, and someone put their foot in the door (R. 247).
Then he testified that he opened the door slightly, at which point someone put a foot in the
door and threatened to pop [.inaudible] (R. 261).
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telling his mother there was no cash in it (R. 174). By exaggerating his claims of victimhood,
he may have hoped to deflect blame from himsel£ 11
Counsel's failure to challenge Christian's home invasion claim was a highly prejudicial
omission, for the juvenile court characterized this robbery as a forced entry home invasion
robbery, and found that the forced entry and home invasion aspects of the robbery were
aggravating in her assessment of the public interest in having Cooper transferred to the adult
court (R. 195-96).
Counsel was ineffective in failing to oppose inadmissible hearsay evidence. Serious
Youth Offender preliminary hearings are unique and focus not only on probable cause, but
also on retention in the juvenile court. They are presided over by juvenile court judges, not
magistrates. See, ~ M.C. v. State, supra, 916 P.2d at 917-918 (discussing why juvenile court
judges presiding over SYO hearings are not considered magistrates functioning under rule of
criminal procedure 7). While hearsay is admissible as to issues of probable cause, Utah R.

Juv. P. 22G), in the retention portion of the hearings, the minor defendants have the right to
cross-examine adverse witnesses, Utah R. Juv. P. 23A(e).
Much of the most damaging evidence at the hearing was hearsay as to Cooper, whose
Serious Youth Offender preliminary hearing was held jointly with Joshua Dutson's with the
assent of Cooper's counsel. Some of the hearsay came from co-defendants and others who

11 People in trouble with the law often inculpate others to detract from their own
liability. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 130-31 (1999); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123, 126-28 (1968); and Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,545 (1986).
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were in deep trouble with the law themselves, and had the resultant need to curry favor with
the police and prosecuting authorities by inculpating others. As a result of the bias that is
~

engendered in such situations, their statements were unreliable as a matter of law. See, ~
T,my, Bruton and Lee, supra. Counsel should have objected to the joint preliminary hearings,
see Utah R. Juv. P. 28, and objected to the hearsay, particularly that from constitutionally
unreliable witnesses, or called them as witnesses to cross-examine them.
For instance, Detective Barker testified without objection that there were multiple
robberies that day, wherein the five suspects had robbed multiple victims of cologne, a
leather jacket, and marijuana, supposedly in Ogden, North Ogden, Harrisville, and Roy (R.
285-86). The rules of evidence generally apply in juvenile court. See Utah R. Juv. P. 43.
The assertions regarding the other robberies qualified as hearsay that was not admissible to
show probable cause for the crimes at issue in this preliminary hearing, and should have
been excluded under Utah Rule ofJuvenile Procedure 23A(e), supra, and Utah Rule of
Evidence 802. See Utah Rule of Evidence 801 (c)(1) and (2) (defining hearsay as a statement
made by the declarant outside of court and admitted by a party to prove the truth of the
assertion in the statement); Rule 802 (excluding hearsay). Under Utah Rules of Evidence
401 through 404, before such evidence of extrinsic crimes was admitted, the Government
should have shown a proper non-character purpose for the evidence, which should have
been relevant to a material fact, and the probative value of the evidence should not have
been exceeded by its potential for prejudice. See,~-, State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837 (1999),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000). Evidence of the other crimes was not admitted for any
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proper non-character purpose, was not relevant to any material fact, and was highly
prejudicial to Cooper. Trial counsel did not object or clarify that only Dexter Skinner and
Wesley Brown were charged in other robberies (R. 167-73), and that Cooper was not.
The detective summarized Joshua's allegations about the charged robbery, wherein
Joshua initially claimed that Cooper had a gun during the robbery, and then said Cooper had
a switchblade (R. 284). He also read Joshua Dotson's 1102 statement into the record to the
effect that they all agreed on Wesley's plan before leaving the house in Ogden to go to
Christian Davidson's, without any hearsay objection from juvenile trial counsel for Cooper

(R. 282-89). Given Joshua's motive to exculpate himself by inculpating others, counsel
should have raised an objection to this unreliable hearsay. E.g." Tj1Jy, Lee and Bruton, supra.
Counsel's fundamental failures to investigate, research and prepare Cooper's
retention case are not properly characterized as strategy. Trial lawyers cannot make valid
strategic decisions absent reasonably necessary and thorough investigation of the facts and
the law. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690.
As is detailed further in Point II, there is a reasonable probability that Cooper would
have remained in the juvenile court had the court been properly informed by the
presentation of a thorough and appropriate retention case. Particularly when the evidence
and law discussed above that were omitted by counsel are compared to the information that
was presented at the Serious Youth Offender hearing (summarized in the statement of facts),
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had counsel properly investigated
and presented Cooper's case for retention. Cf. Houskeeper, supra. This is particularly so
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because the adult court's jurisdiction to preside over Cooper's case, to take his pleas, and to
sentence him to prison were all dependent on the defective bindover in this Serious Youth
~

vJ

Offender case. E.g., Utah Code Ann.§ 78a-6-702; M.C. v. State, 916 P.2d 914, 915-917
(Utah App. 1996) (recognizing that orders transferring minors to adult court are final and
appealable as they end juvenile court jurisdiction and initiate adult court jurisdiction).

II.

The Juvenile Court Misinterpreted the Amended Serious Youth Offender Statute.
The court's assessment of the retention factors was repeatedly skewed against

Cooper by the court's misinterpretation of the statute.

A. Cooper's Relative Culpability Was the Lowest Among the Defendants'.
All Serious Youth Offender cases by definition involve violent crimes, and thus,
courts must compare the relative culpability of the participants to detennine whether a child
should be retained in the protective confines of the juvenile court. See State v. Lara, 2003
UT App 318, ,I 29, 79 P.3d 951, supra. Under 78A-6-702(c)(tl) (2013), because there were
multiple perpetrators, the court should have assessed whether Cooper appeared "to have a
greater or lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants."
The court found Cooper's culpability significant, but did not articulate the culpability
of the defendants other than Cooper for purposes of comparison and did not actually find
whether Cooper had a greater or lesser degree of culpability in comparison to all the others
involved in the crime. The court's final order stated:
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4. These offenses were committed with other co-defendants. The Court
therefore considers the Defendant's degree of culpability in comparison to the other
co-defendants, and finds that his culpability was significant.
a. Mr. Van Huizen's involvement was less at the scene of the crime than
others. There is insufficient evidence that he brandished a gun or switchblade knife
during the commission of the burglary or robberies although he was present and
assisted in the forced entrance into the home with the co-defendants.
b. Mr. Van Huizen's involvement was to plan and facilitate the robberies.
Specifically the guns used were guns from Mr. Van Huizen's home. Mr. Van Huizen
provided the guns knowing they would be used in the burglary and robberies.
c. Mr. Van Huizen's assistance in the robbery ensured that the other codefendants would have guns to use when breaking into the home and robbing the
persons therein.

(R. 195).
Without carefully comparing Cooper's culpability to the co-defendants', the court was
in no position to make a meaningful assessment of whether Cooper should remain in
juvenile court. Review of the record confinns that the relative culpability factor should have
weighed in favor of his being retained in juvenile court. Cooper was the youngest and
second smallest of the codefendants, the oldest of whom, Wesley Brown and Dexter
Skinner, had multiple felony cases pending (e.g. R. 167-69; R. 170-72). Dexter Skinner had
schemed by text messages with Joshua Dutson the day before the robbery to "grab them
straps" (Cooper's father's guns) and rob some people, while, in a separate text message
conversation wherein Joshua claimed to be "high" and appeared to be joking, Joshua invited
Cooper to rob some people (R. 295-96, 450). The next day, after Cooper was driven to
Skinner by Tomek Perkins and did not bring the guns, Skinner and the others took Cooper
back to his father's house to retrieve the guns before the robbery that Wesley had planned
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the day after the text conversation (R. 295-96, 450). Christian Davidson identified Skinner
as the person who had his gun out by his side when the robbers forced their way into the
home, and who threatened to pop or bust a cap (fire a shot) if Christian did not let them in

(R. 247-49, 251253, 260,261). During the robbery that followed the conversation in the
basement about Dexter's or Wesley's gun having bodies on it (people who had been killed
buy it), Christian said that Dexter Skinner was the first one to point his gun at Christian and
demand his property, and also demanded the other bag of marijuana he had seen Christian
put in his pocket before the robbery began (R. 248, 251-52). Skinner asked for Christian's
money and directed one of his cohorts to take Davidson's wallet and phone (R. 254).
Inasmuch as Christian originally indicated during the photo array that it was the third
gunman who took his wallet and phone (R. 310), and then was unsure that Cooper was this
person (R. 257), it appears that Joshua Dutson, who admitted to being the third gunman (R.
284,289), was the person who took Christian's wallet and phone.
Wesley Brown had previously lived in the home where the robbery occurred, knew
there would be drugs there, and planned the robbery (R. 248-49). He pulled a gun during
the robbery and pointed it at Christian Davidson while discussing Brown's displeasure at
Christian's having awakened him with a pipe in a past incident (R. 255). Wesley went
upstairs to pay an armed visit to Davidson's mother, who had previously taken Wesley in to
live there until he bragged of killing a man in Louisiana and she asked him to leave (R. 174,
282-83, 294).
Tomek Perkins provided the real-looking airsoft gun used by Joshua during the
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robbery (R. 301-02). He brought Cooper to Skinner's house the morning of the robbery,

~
I
I

drove everyone to Cooper's to retrieve his father's guns, and was the getaway driver for the
robbery (R. 283, 288).

·<&,

Joshua Dutson was a juvenile whose phone records documented his dealing and
using illegal drugs with multiple people (R. 267, 329-337). The day before the robbery, when
Cooper texted him and asked him to "chill," Joshua suggested they go to Dexter's and
smoke marijuana (R. 445-47). While claiming to be high,Joshua invited Cooper to
participate in robbing people as if it were a joke, while simultaneously scheming with Dexter
Skinner in a separate text message conversation about inviting Cooper to participate in
robbing people, grabbing "them straps" (Cooper's father's guns), and robbing people the
next day (R. 295-96, 450). Joshua pulled and held the real-looking airsoft gun pointed at the
ground during the robbery (R. 247).
According to the preliminary hearing evidence, Cooper provided two of the three

:~

guns, none of which were loaded and one of which was broken, and was present and passive
during the robbery (R. 284, 296). Cooper jokingly agreed to participate in robbing
I~

unspecified people during the text conversation the day before (R. 447-449), but the actual
robbery was planned the next day by Wesley Brown, who knew Christian Davidson would
have drugs. Cooper did not know Wesley or Tomek or Christian before the day of the
robbery (R. 293).
The court made no mention of the facts that Cooper was the youngest and second to
the smallest defendant and the least developmentally equipped to be making good decisions,
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given his youth, who was further impaired by his marijuana use. 12 The court did not require
an evaluation of Cooper prior to sending him to adult court. Had the court done so,
evidence was readily available that Cooper was developmentally susceptible to peer pressure,
given his level of maturity and development. An evaluation would have confirmed that
Cooper's relative culpability was the lowest among the defendants involved in the robbery.
See Dr. Davies' evaluation (R. 406).

B.

Cooper's Role in the Offense was Not Violent or Aggressive And Was
Not Highly Premeditated.

All crimes in Serious Youth Offender cases are violent, aggressive and intentional and
Vii

thus premeditated to a degree, and thus courts must focus on the role of the individual child
and consider the extent to which the role was violent, aggressive or premeditated in
determining whether to retain them in juvenile court. E.g. Lara, s,pra. In the court's ruling
on the extent to which Cooper's role in the offense was committed in a violent, aggressive or
premeditated manner, the court repeatedly attributed the violent and aggressive actions of
others to Cooper because he provided the guns they used. The court ruled:
5. Mr. Van Huizen's role in the offense was committed in a violent aggressive,
or premeditated manner.
a. These offenses were committed with guns and threats of violence. The
guns belonged to Mr. Van Huizen and were provided knowing they would be used in
the burglary and robberies. This planning occurred over a period of time and was not
a spur of the moment decision.
b. Mr. Van Huizen was with co-defendants who forced their way at gun point
into one of the most protected and sacred areas in our society, the home.
12 See, ~ R. 406 (Dr. Davies' evaluation) and n. 7, s,pra.
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c. The violence committed in the home was facilitated by Mr. Van Huizen's
planning and preparation. Mr. Van Huizen knew that the guns were intended to be
used in a burglary and robbery for drugs.
cl. Mr. Van Huizen's presence in the home, by itself, was a threat to the
victims and a danger to others who were in or could have come into the home.

(R. 195-96).
The evidence showed that Cooper's role in the offense was not violent or aggressive.
There was no testimony that he was one of the people who showed a gun prior to entering
the house, put his foot in the door or told Davidson he had to let them in and to go
downstairs. The court found that Cooper did not brandish any weapon during the entire
offense (R. 195). There is no evidence that he threatened anyone in any way. While Cooper
was present, his liability for the offenses was accomplice liability. Even under the more
severe pre-2013 version of the Serious Youth Offender law, the court should have focused
on Cooper's actual role during the offense in assessing his level of violence, aggression and
premeditation, rather than holding him accountable for the violent and aggressive actions of
his co-perpetrators. See State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 318, ,r 28, 79 P.3d 951.
In Lara, the Court reversed the juvenile court's application of the statute in finding
that Lara had acted in a violent and aggressive way, because instead of focusing on Lara's
actual individual role, the court "focused on the actions of the other participants."

,r 28.

The Court recognized that all offenses eligible for prosecution under the Serious Youth
Offender statute are by nature violent, and that if a transfer order could be premised on the
violent nature of the offenses charged, rather than on the basis of a comparison of the
juvenile's behavior vis-a-vis his co-perpetrators, all SYO defendants would be transferred to
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the adult court. Id. at ,r 29. The Court also reversed the juvenile court's reasoning that Lara
was equally culpable with his co-perpetrators unless he could show no involvement in the
~

~

crime. Id. at ,r 29. The Court explained that if the juvenile were not involved in the crime,
he would not have been charged, and that "the relevant inquiry is whether the juvenile is less
blameworthy than the codefendants because he was not the initiator or driving force behind
the crime, did not use a weapon or threaten the victim, or otherwise played a less active role
in the crime." Id. Because Lara had stayed in the back seat of the car while his coperpetrators perpetrated the robbery and assault, and only drove the victim's car away, the
Court found that he had carried his burden to show that his role in the offense involved less
culpability than that of his co-perpetrators. Id The Court noted that the State had
presented no fonn of conspiracy or aiding such as encouragement. Id. at ,I 30.
As to premeditation, the Court found that Lara's participation was incidental, not
premeditated, because the co-perpetrators approached the victim, robbed her of her keys at
gunpoint, had her kneel outside her car, looked in the car and then went and talked to Lara
and gave him gave the keys, before Lara walked from the car he was in and got in the
victim's truck and drove away, stopping to pick up a co-perpetrator. Id. at ,r,J 32-33. The
Court ruled that the facts showed that the other robbers decided that Lara would drive the
stolen truck when they realized it had a standard transmission they could not drive, and that
his role in the aggravated robbery was spontaneous, not premeditated. Id. The State
petitioned for review of the reinstatement of the appeal on certiorari, and the Utah Supreme
Court affinned this Court's opinion. State v. Lara, 2005 UT 70, 124 P.3d 243.
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As for premeditation, the court ruled that there were several steps in this robbery,
and that Cooper could have extricated himself from it before it occurred (R. 374). A
psychological evaluation would have provided important information regarding this factor as
well, for Cooper's adolescent brain was biologically less able to anticipate the consequences
of his actions, and that he was not equipped to extricate himself from the robbery despite
knowing it was wrong. E.g. R. 406, supra. While Joshua Dutson told the police that
everyone was aware of the plan that Wesley created, there was no evidence presented that
Cooper was involved in the actual planning of the robbery of Christian Davidson and Ryan
Golding. The text message conversation between Joshua and Skinner shows that they were
scheming to get Cooper's father's guns the night before when Joshua invited Cooper to
participate in a separate text message conversation (R. 295-96, 450), and Wesley Brown
planned the robbery of Davidson, as he had previously lived in that home with him and
knew he would have drugs (R. 282-83, 306). Thus, the premeditation was primarily done by
the older, more sophisticated defendants and Cooper's role was less premeditated.

C.

The Public Safety Interest Called For Cooper's Retention in the
Juvenile Court

The court ruled that public safety was better served by transferring Cooper to the
adult court, reasoning:
a. Mr. Van Huizen is 16 years old and juvenile court jurisdiction is limited until
the age of 21; the district court's jurisdiction is not limited.
b. The involvement of drugs, violence, firearms, and forcing entry into a home
to commit robberies places these offenses among the most serious in our community.
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c. The likelihood of harm to others was great given the facts of this case.
People understandably react violently to such acts of aggression, particularly when
they occur in the home. Acts of this nature are extremely volatile and can easily lead
to even fatal hann to law enforcement and other members of the public.
d. Public safety requires a strong response and longer correctional period than
is available in the juvenile court.
e. The defense provided evidence of a loving family and good home. The
court finds that will help the Defendant in tenns of his long term rehabilitation, but it
also works against him in this case. Despite the benefits of that home he chose to
engage in violent and irresponsible acts that put the safety of members of the public
at grave risk

(R. 196).
From its ruling on public safety, it appears that the juvenile court relied on the old
law such as A.B. and M.E.P., to the effect that public safety is served by transferring minors
to the adult system where lengthier sentences are available, and was not aware of the 2013
Serious Youth Offender amendments and their intent or that retaining Serious Youth
Offender minors in the juvenile system serves the public safety interest By giving juveniles
the many benefits available in the juvenile system, courts serve the public interest in security
by refonning juveniles into law-abiding members of society. In contrast, by sending
juveniles to the adult system, courts disserve the interest of public safety, because these
children who are placed in the adult facilities and system may well be melded into
accomplished criminals and will not be adequately supervised and refonned before they are
released and recidivate. See Point IB, supra.
The court's public safety analysis largely turned on the serious nature of the offenses
charged, and the potential volatility and hypothetical threats they can pose to perpetrators,
the police and the public, given that others may respond violently to such crimes (R. 196).
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This general and hypothetical approach would ostensibly lead to transfer in all Serious Youth
Offender cases, which by nature involve violent crimes that can prompt violent responses
and pose threats to law enforcement and members of the public.13 The court's belief that
the crimes charged here are among the most serious in our community similarly did not take
into account the range of offenses subject to retention under the Serious Youth Offender
statute. The statute contemplates that retention in juvenile court may be appropriate for
even more serious offenses involving intended and actual, rather than potential, serious
injuries or intended death to the victims. In characterizing the crime as a dangerous breach
of the sanctity of the home, the court did not recognize that aggravated burglaries and
robberies are among the crimes that routinely result in Serious Youth Offender prosecutions
under the statute, and that those minors who commit such offenses are nonetheless subject
to retention in the juvenile court pursuant to the plain terms of§ 78a-6-702 (2013).
Nor did the court account for the facts that the guns were not loaded, and that the
robbery began after an amicable conversation that even Christian Davidson acknowledged
occurred in the basement before the robbery (R. 184), countering the notion of a home
invasion robbery.

13 The Serious Youth Offender Act applies to aggravated arson, aggravated assault
with serious bodily injury, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery,
aggravated sexual assault, felony discharge of a firearm, attempted aggravated murder,
attempted murder, and felony-level weapons offenses committed by juveniles with prior
convictions of that type.
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The court held it against Cooper that he came from a loving family and good home,
because he chose to commit the crimes despite his fortunate upbringing (R. 196). The court
i.diJ

did not consider Cooper's biological lack of development to make good choices, and that
Cooper's upbringing and complete lack of juvenile history demonstrated that the robbery
was a significant aberration from his law-abiding life which suggested that his caring parents
would successfully aid him in reforming during the five years he could remain in the juvenile
system if he were retained. The court concluded that Cooper needed a longer correctional
period than the five years the juvenile system could provide, despite his complete absence of
prior history and his good home, and his relatively minor and nonviolent role in the crime.
The court may well have ruled differently had the court been made aware of the basis for the
amendments to the Serious Youth Offender Act - to ensure that first time offenders such as
Cooper are rehabilitated in juvenile court, rather than criminalized, stigmatized and released
relatively quickly without treatment from the adult system, to recidivate more violently in the
future. See Point IB, supra.
In assessing the public's safety interest in Cooper's being prosecuted in adult or
juvenile court, the court did not require an evaluation of Cooper by a psychologist, and
assumed from the facts of this one case that there was a great likelihood of further injury and
harm. Had the court required or received a professional evaluation, the court could have
had a solid evidentiary basis for assessing the low risk of future hann posed by Cooper, his
amenability to refonn, and the public safety interest in keeping Cooper in the juvenile
system. See Davies evaluation.

41
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

D.

Cooper Lacked a Qualifying Prior Weapon-Related Offense And Had
No Prior Offenses.

With regard to factors one and four, the court ruled twice that Cooper had no prior
record in the juvenile court, without separately recognizing one of the actual statutory
criteria: that he had no prior weapons-related offense that would have been a felony had he
committed one (R 194, 196), see § 78A-6-702(c)(i), supra. This is important because it
demonstrates the egregious type of juvenile history that might normally justify transferring a
minor into the adult court, which Cooper did not have.
Cooper's complete lack of a prior history in juvenile court should have weighed
heavily in favor of retention. See legislative history of 2013 amendments, in the addendum.

E. Cooper's Interest in Remaining in Juvenile Court Was High.
Without articulating this aspect of the ruling in any fashion, the court found by clear
and convincing evidence that it was not in Cooper's best interest to be prosecuted in adult
court (R. 197). The court should have expressly considered the refonnative benefits
available to Cooper in juvenile court, in contrast to the risks posed to and hanns that befall
minors such as Cooper when they go into the adult system, discussed above.
As detailed in Point I, the juvenile court was disadvantaged in her assessment of the
actual facts of Cooper's retention case, because Cooper's counsel did not investigate and
present the relevant law and evidence. Because counsel did not properly assert the facts and
law on Cooper's behalf, or object to the court's errors discussed above, if necessary, this
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Court may reach the merits of Cooper's claims through the doctrine of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Criminal defense lawyers are required to investigate and assert both the facts and
lj

the law on their clients' behalf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Trial lawyers must properly
preserve all issues. See,~ State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at ,I 10, 67 P.3d 1005. When
counsel fail to assert beneficial, current law, this constitutes objectively deficient
performance, which will not be excused by the courts for hypothetical tactical reasons. See,
State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989).
The court's failure to compare Cooper's culpability to that of his co-perpetrators,
holding Cooper accountable for his codefendant's behavior in the assessment of the nature
of Cooper's role in the offense, hypothetical assessment of the public safety interest, and
failure to separately recognize that he had no prior weapons offense constitute obvious
error, based on the plain language of the Serious Youth Offender statute and the controlling
case law interpretjng similar language in the predecessor statute, ~ Lara, supra. Counsel
should have objected to the errors and was objectively deficient in failing to do so.
As there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had the court been fully
apprised of the relevant evidence and law, and had the court followed the law, Cooper has
proved prejudice to justify relief under both the plain error and ineffective assistance of
counsel doctrines. See Verde, supra.
Given the significant changes in the law in the 2013 amendments shortly before
Cooper's preliminary hearing, of which the lower court and parties were apparently not
aware, the Court may correct the errors resulting from deviation from the 2013 amendments
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with the exceptional circumstances doctrine. E.g., State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1134 n.2
(Utah 1994) (allowing state constitutional claim for first time on certiorari under this
doctrine, because law had changed during pendency of the case).

III.

The Juvenile Court Judge Should Have Disqualified Herself.

''Nothing is more damaging to the public confidence in the legal system than the
appearance of bias or prejudice on the part of the judge." State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273,
278 (Utah 1989).14 "The purity and integrity of the judicial process ought to be protected
against any taint of suspicion to the end that the public and litigants may have the highest
confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts." Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520,
523 (Utah 1948).15
Cooper's juvenile court judge who presided over Cooper's case and signed the order
delivering him to the adult court is married to the Chief Deputy over the Criminal Division
of the Weber County Attorney's Office that was prosecuting Cooper (R. 504-05). In addition

14 In Gardner, the trial judge did not recuse after an affidavit of bias was filed
premised on the fact that the trial judge worked in the same courthouse as the murder and
other crimes at issue at trial had occurred. The supreme court found that any error
stemming from any appearance of bias was harmless because Gardner did not show actual
prejudice or a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. Id. at 278.15 In Haslam, the court ruled that a judge is disqualified if actually biased and
prejudiced, which the court defined: ''Bias and prejudice mean a hostile feeling or spirit of ill
will toward one of the litigants, or undue friendship or favoritism toward one." Id. at 523.
The court found no such bias or prejudice in the allegations that the judge had previously
presided in a case involving the petitioner, had found his testimony incredible, and had
interrupted his testimony. Id. at 525.
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to being married to the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division of the prosecuting attorney's
office, the juvenile court judge fonnerly worked in the same office as her husband, as a
(,zi}i

Deputy Weber County Attorney juvenile court prosecutor representing the State - in the
same position as Cooper's juvenile court prosecutor (R. 504-05). The juvenile court judge
did not disqualify herself, notify counsel for the parties, Cooper, or his parents of these facts,
or obtain their consent to preside. When Cooper and his parents learned of these facts, they
averred that had they known them before, they would have requested that Cooper's lifealtering juvenile court case be presided over by someone who was not tied to Cooper's
prosecution (R. 428, 657, 659-662).
At a minimum, these facts created the appearance of impropriety. Compare Smith v.
Beckman, 683 P.2d 1214 (Colo. 1984). In holding that a judge's marriage to a deputy district
attorney assigned to juvenile court matters required his disqualification in an adult court case
involving the district attorney's office, wherein the wife did not participate, the Beckman
court explained,
The circumstances here are such that an appearance of impropriety is created
by the close nature of the marriage relationship. A husband and wife generally
conduct their personal and financial affairs as a partnership. In addition to living
together, a husband and wife are also perceived to share confidences regarding their
personal lives and employment situations. Generally, the public views married people
as "a couple," as "a partnership," and as participants in a relationship more intimate
than any other kind of relationship between individuals. In our view the existence of
a marriage relationship between a judge and a deputy district attorney in the same
county is sufficient to establish grounds for disqualification, even though no other
facts call into question the judge's impartiality. Therefore, we hold that Judge
Beckman should have granted the motion and disqualified himself.
: Id. at 1216.
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If only to uphold the appearance of justice and to avoid the appearance of bias, the
judge in Cooper's case should have disqualified hersel£ Cf. id. Our state case law recognizes
that impartial judges are not just key to individual cases, but are also critical to the reputation
of the judiciary. Utah historically has encouraged judges to scrupulously protect the integrity
of the judiciary by recusing themselves when there is even a colorable claim of bias. See,
Haslam v. Morrison, supra-, and State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah),16 cert. denied,
497 U.S. 1220 (1988). Similarly, the preamble to the Code ofJudicial Conduct recognizes
the key role judges play in our nation's justice system, and the concomitant need for judges
to conduct themselves with the impartiality and integrity essential to fostering public
confidence in the judicial system. The first canon of the code and Rule 1.2 of that canon
require judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety and to maintain and
foster the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Canon 2 and rule 2.2 require judges to
perform their duties with impartiality and fairness. Rule 2.3 requires judges to proceed
without bias or prejudice. Judges are to ensure that family interests and relationships do not
influence their performance or judgment. See Rule 2.4(B).
~--'

Rule 2.11 requires judges to disqualify themselves if their impartiality might reasonably

16 In Neeley. the court found that there was no abuse of discretion or actual bias
involved in a trial judge's refusing to recuse himself based on his previously having signed
criminal informations and previously having been present for the defendant's pleading guilty
in cases some twenty years prior. Id. at 1094. This Court affirmed in State v.Jonas, 793
P.2d 902 (Utah App. 1990), on similar facts, wherein the same trial judge was the district
attorney in multiple prior prosecutions, and dismissed one case against the defendant when
acting as prosecutor. Id. at 910.
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be questioned, including instances wherein they have a bias or prejudice toward a party, a
party's lawyer, or if their spouse is "officer, director, general partner, managing member, or
trustee of a party[.]" As the rule tacitly recognizes, the judge's marriage to the Chief
Criminal Deputy of the office prosecuting Cooper gives rise to bias or prejudice toward the
party's lawyer. And the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division of the prosecution office
prosecuting Cooper is properly considered an officer, director or managing member of a
party, and an attorney of the party if not the party itself. Cf. Regional Sales Agency v.
Reichert, 830 P.2d 252,255 n.1 (Utah 1992) (finding that judge's relatives, who were equity
partners in a law firm representing a party on appeal fell within the statutory definition and
required disqualification of the appellate judge who was married to and related to the equity
partners, and noting split of authority regarding whether attorneys are included in the tenn
"parties" in similar statutes).
While there was no evidentiary hearing to explore the involvement of the judge's
husband in Cooper's case, the record reflects that after Cooper went to prison, he was
involved in Cooper's case as the prosecutor originally designated by Weber County Attorney
to deal with present counsel for Cooper in her efforts to obtain discovery and settle the case

(R. 523). The record also reflects that on May 21, 2014, after present counsel began
challenging Cooper's convictions, the judge's husband ordered a recording of one of the
hearings and a copy of the final commitment (R. 635, docket entries on 5/21/14). The fact
that the judge's husband was involved in this case at least at the adult court level after the
bindover adds to the impropriety and appearance of impropriety resulting from the judge's
47
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presiding over the hearing that delivered Cooper into the adult system. Cf. Utah Code of
Judicial Administration 2.11(A)(6)(a) (requiring disqualification if the judge "was associated
with a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such
association[.]").
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-222 provides:
(1) Except by consent of all parties, a justice, judge, or justice court judge may
not sit or act in any action or proceeding:
(a) to which he is a party, or in which he is interested;
(b) when he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity
within the third degree, computed according to the rules of the common law;
or
(c) when he has been attorney or counsel for either party in the action
or proceeding.

As noted in Reichert, supra, the term "party'' in similar statutes may be interpreted to include
the attorneys for the parties, such as Cooper's judge's husband. Thus subsection (l)(b)
required the court to obtain the parties' consent before presiding further. With regard to
subsection (1)(c), while a judge may preside in a case involving a party previously represented
in a separate matter by the judge or the judge's prior firm, 17 this is a fact-dependent issue that
requires consideration of various factors.
These factors could include, inter alia, whether the judge continues to have a financial
interest in the firm, whether the judge has maintained close personal relationships
with members of that firm, whether a family member of the judge works for the finn,
whether the judge had significant involvement with the client while a member of the
17 Utah R. Professional Conduct 1.0(d) defines the term "firm" in terms broad
enough to encompass governmental offices.
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furn, or whether the judge's association with the £inn is particularly recent. See Utah
Code Ann.§ 78-7-1(1); Utah Code ofJudicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1); see also ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics & Grievances, Infonnal Op. 594 (October 22, 1962)
(listing some factors that would make disqualification appropriate in case involving
judge's fonner £inn."
In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Utah 1997). 18 By analogy, particularly because
her husband still worked for the office prosecuting Cooper, the judge's prior representation
of the State in the same position as Cooper's prosecutor counseled in favor of
disqualification under the statute. See id.
The service of a "competent person ... authorized by law to detennine the questions" is
the first element of due process guaranteed by Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution in cases
involving life or liberty, Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314,317 (Utah 1945), such as this.
The service of an impartial judge is recognized as so essential to the proper functiorri,ng of a
criminal trial that the absence of an impartial judge constitutes structural error under federal
constitutional law. See,~ Arizona v. Fuhninante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-310 (1991) (structural
errors are those which undennine the fundamental integrity of criminal trials, and which are
so pervasive as to defy harmless error analysis). Under the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution, issues of judicial bias are assessed from an objective perspective,
and proof of actual bias is not required to justify relief. See Caperton v. A.C. Massey, Inc.,

18 This opinion is solely that of then-Chief Justice Zimmerman. See id. at 1153.
While it does not represent a majority opinion, it has been cited with approval in several of
Utah appellate opinions. E.g., Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ,I 49, 2015 UT LEXIS 51;
Spafford v. Granite Credit Union, 2011 Ut App 401, 1J 41, 266 P .3d 866.
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556 U.S. 868 (2009). 19 If an average judge, who is influenced by human weaknesses and
normal psychological tendencies, on the facts at issue would likely be neutral, then the judge
may continue presiding. On the other hand, if there is an impermissible risk of prejudgment
or actual bias or temptation leading away from balanced judging, Due Process does not
permit the judge to continue on the case. See id.
The risk of bias in a case such as this, wherein the judge was asked to sign the order
sending a minor into the adult criminal system by the prosecutorial office wherein her
husband was the Chief Deputy over the Criminal Division, and wherein the judge had
previously worked in the same role as Cooper's juvenile court prosecutor, violated due
process under the Caperton standard. The average person in such circumstances would be
tempted away from balanced judging, and prejudgment and actual bias may have been
present as well. Cf. id.
Judges are presumed to be qualified, and the fact that a judge ruled against a party is
not in itself evidence of bias. In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1153-54 (Utah 1997).
To obtain relief on appeal, a party must normally show actual bias or an abuse of discretion.
See Neeley, 1094-95. Actual bias is defined as "undue friendship or favoritism" toward a
party. Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1948); In re Young, 984 P.2d 997, 1007
(Utah 1999). Relief is also required if the defendant proves that his substantial rights were
19 In Caperton. the Court held that a supreme court justice's failure to recuse himself
from an appeal from a fifty million dollar verdict when the principal officer of the company
appealing that verdict had contributed more than three million dollars to the justice's
campaign violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
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affected by showing a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had the judge recused
herself. State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 611-612 (Utah App. 1997). If the judge, as opposed
~

to the jury, is the ultimate factfinder, the likelihood of prejudice from erroneous service of
the judge is greater. Cf. State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201,204 (Utah App. 1992).20
The judge's marriage to the Chief Criminal Deputy of the Weber County Attorney's
office and prior service as a juvenile court prosecutor representing the State, the same party
prosecuting Cooper, required the court to recuse herself under Rule 2.11(2)(a) and§ 78A-2222(b) and (c). As the Beckman court recognized, spouses are reasonably expected to
operate as a partnership. Cooper's judge's ti.es to the prosecution give rise to the reasonable
inference that she felt favoritism toward a party, and meet the definition of actual bias. See
In re Young. An objective view of the situation recognizes that there would be an
"impermissible risk of prejudgment or actual bias or temptation leading away from balanced
judging" for a judge in this circumstance, requiring disqualification under the Due Process
standard. See Caperton, supra. This structural, constitutional, statutory, common law and
rule violation requires reversal of the bindover order, even if it is viewed solely as giving rise
to the appearance of impropriety. Compare Reiche~ supra.
While Beckman is not binding in Utah, the remainder of the foregoing law requiring
the judge to disqualify herself was controlling prior to Cooper's preliminary hearing. The
court's failure to comply with the law constitutes obvious error. As detailed above, under
20 In Ontiveros, a challenge was brought because the murder at issue was committed
shortly after judge had released Ontiveros on another case. This Court ruled there was no
prejudice because there was no actual bias and the jury decided the case.
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the 2013 amended Serious Youth Offender statute, Cooper should have been retained in the
juvenile court. Particularly because there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result
had a different judge presided, Cooper has proved prejudice from the judge's failure to
recuse herself, and has justified relief under Alonzo and the plain error doctrine.

CONCLUSION
The individual and cumulative effect of the foregoing errors justifies an opinion
reversing the bindover order, vacating Cooper's convictions and pleas, and remanding the
case to the juvenile court. See Lara, supra.

Respectfully submitted on April 1, 2015.
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT

FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER ON BIND OVER

vs.

COOPER VAN HUIZEN,
Defendant.

Case Nwnber: 1003447
Judge: Michelle E Heward

This matter came before the court for a preliminary hearing/examination and a
subsequent best interest hearing, on December 20, 2013. The State was present and represented
by Brody E. Flint, I)eputy Weber County Attorney. The Defendant was present and represented
by his attorney, .Rex Bray; co-defendant Josh Parley Dutson was present and represented by
counsel, Mary Ann Ellis. The Court heard evidence from all parties and being fully apprised,
now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The State met its burden and the court finds probable cause to believe that the

criIµes listed in ·the Information, two aggravated robberies and one aggravated burglary, occurred
as alleged.

2.

Further, there is probable cause to believe that Cooper Van Huizen committed the

:~

offenses alleged in the Information.
3.

The Defendant has no prior record in the juvenile court.

FILED
JAN 1120;~
-·

JUVENILE.COURT

RF.CONO JUDICIAL OISTRIC'T'
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4.

These offenses were committed with other co-defendants. The Court therefore

considers the Defendant's degree of culpability in comparison to the other co-defendants, and

finds that his culpability was significant.
Mr. Van Huizen's involvement was less at the scene of the crime than

a.

others. There is insufficient evidence that he brandished a gun or switchblade knife
during the commission of the burglary or robberies although he was present and assisted

in the forced entrance into the home with co-defendants.

b.

Mr. Van Huizen's involvement was to plan and facilitate the robberies.

Specifically the guns used were guns from Mr. Van Huizen's home. Mr. Van Huizen
provided the guns knowing they would be used in the burglary and robberies.

Mr. Van Huizen's assistance in the robbery ensured that the other co-

c.

defendants would have guns to use when breaking into the home and robbing the persons
therein.

S.

Mr. Van Huizen's role in the offense was committed in a violent, aggressive, or

premeditated manner.
a.

These offenses were committed with guns and threats of violence. The

guns belonged to Mr. Van Huizen and were provided knowing they would be used in the
burglary and robberies. This planning occurred over a period of time and was not ~ spur
of the moment decision.
b.

Mr. Van Huizen was with co-defendants who forced their way at gun

point into one of the most protected and sacred areas in our society, the home.
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c.

The violence committed in the home was facilitated by Mr. Van Huizen's

planning and preparation. Mr. Van Huizen knew that the guns were intended to be used
in a burglary and robbery for drugs.
d.

Mr. Van Huizen' s presence in the home, by itself, was a threat to the

victims and a danger to others who were in or could have come into the home.
6.

This is Mr. Van Huizen's first offense injuvenile court.

7.

Public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in the district court.

a.

Mr. Van Huizen is 16 years old and juvenile court jurisdiction is limited

until the age of21; the district court's jurisdiction is not limited.
b.

The involvement of drugs, violence, :firearms, and forcing entry into a

home to commit robberies places these offenses among the most serious in our
community.
c.

The likelihood of harm to others was great given the facts of this case.

People understandably react violently to such acts of aggression, particularly when they
occur in the home. Acts of this nature are extremely volatile and can easily lead to even
fatal harm to law enforcement and other members of the public.

d.

Public safety requires a strong response and longer correctional period

than is available in the juvenile court.

e.

The defense provided evidence of a loving family and good home. The

court finds that will help the Defendant in terms of his long tenn rehabilitation, but it also
works against him in this case. Despite the benefits of that home he chose to engage in
violent and irresponsible acts that put the safety of members of the public at grave risk.
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8.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it would be contrary to the

best interest of the Defendant to bind him over to the jurisdiction of the district court.
9.

The defense has not shown, however, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is

in the best interest of the public for this case to be adjudicated in juvenile court. The court finds
that it

is contrary to the best interests of the public to allow the case to remain in juvenile court.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER

The Defendant should be and hereby is bound over to the district court for further
proceedings on the Information.

DATED

An arrest warrant has issued and bail has been set.

thisL clay of January, 2014.
BY THE COURT:
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interest of the public to bind the defendants over to the

2

juri sdicti on of the district court.

3

The Court wants to make sure that I'm making a record

4

that is clear for both of the defendants individually and not

5

placing them together.

6

questions with regard to the findings as I go through here that

7

you ask questions if I'm not clear- with regard to each of your

8

clients and to the State's interest so that I can make sure that

9

that record is clear, and I ' ll attempt to do that.

10

Counsel, I'll ask if there are any

The Court has considered the five statutory factors that

11

are set forth in 78A-6-702(3) (c).

12

stipulation has been found to go in favor of each of the

13

defendants.

14

juvenile court tha t are of any significance here.

15

The first of those factors by

Neither one of them have prior records here in the

The second factor is whethe~ the offenses were committed

16

with one or more persons -- I'm sorry, these off enses were

17

committed with one or more persons, so the Court considers

18

whether each of the minor's involvement, whether each of them

19

had a greater or lesser degree of culpability than their co-

20

defendants.

21

With regard to Mr. JPD, the Court finds that his role

22

in carrying out the offenses was one of planning and pulling

23

people together.

24

culpability of Mr. JPD both before and during the actual offense

25

shows that he had culpability.

The evidence before the Court shows that the
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1

He was involved in acquiring guns prior

2

with the knowledge that they would be used in the robbery.

3

was in a place to use those weapons to gain entry.

4

he was in on the plan to use the weapons to gain entry into the

5

home, and to take what he and his co-defendants wanted from the

6

people within the home.

7

He

I'm sorry,

While the Court does not find that he poi nted a gun at

8

either of the victims -- I'm just not sure what happened there --

9

but I do find that .that was done by two of - the - - the two adults

10

that were involved.

11

culpability in insuring that that would happen, that t he people

12

that he was with would pull guns and use t hem after breaking int o

13

the home.

14

Mr. JPD's involvement had a high degree of

Wi th regard to Mr. CVH, the Court finds that his

15

involvement was less in terms of hi s physical involvement at the

16

scene.

17

have insufficient evidence to determine whether he had a

18

switch -- the switchblade that had been referred to by others

19

that have test i fied he r e today.

I don't have evidence that he brandished a gun, and I

20

Hi s involvement was in planning and facilitating , the

21

o f fenses.

22

Mr. JPD's.

23

planned out in terms of how the guns would be used.

24

of the second factor, the Court finds that the invol vement of

25

each of the

His i nvolvement was actually greater than that of
These were his guns from his home, and this was wel l
So in terms

each of these defendants was significant in terms
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of the offenses.

2

Whether the role - - the third factor as the extent of

3

the minor's role in -- was •it committed in a violent, aggressive

4

or premeditated manner .

5

been

6

spur of the moment, a dumb or a childish decision, a quick

7

reaction.

8

robberies and the burglary.

9

The premeditation in these offenses has

already been referred to by the Court.

This was not a

Both defendants were involved in planning th e

There were multiple steps that were carried out prior to

10

actually going out to the home.

11

time, giving both of the defendants ample opportunity to retract

12

themselves from the offenses, but they chose not to do so.

13

were violent and aggressive offenses with the use of guns and

14

threats , going inside one of the most protected and sacred places

15

in our society, the home.

16

This took place over a period of

These

The violence that was employed, albeit by others in

17

terms of pulling the guns, was made possible by Mr. CVH and

18

facilitated by Mr. JPD.

19

Mr. CVH and the planning or pulling together of the parties and

20

facilitation by Mr. JPD, they both -- both of these defendants

21

forced their way into a home with the assistance of friends

22

that they were with who were using guns, and their physical

23

presence -- I'm talking about the defendant's physical presence

24

was a threat when the offense took place.

25

the roles of both JPD and CVH to have been involved involved

In addition to providing the guns by

The Court finds that

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-1351

violence, aggression and were premeditated.

2

The nwnber and nature -- the next factor is the nwnber

3

and nature of prior adjudications in the juvenile court.

4

Court finds that those again go in favor of the defendants here.

5

They do not have violent -- or they do not have records of any

6

significance here in the juvenile court.

7

The

The fifth factor is whether public safety is better

8

served by adjudicating the minors in the juvenile court or in the

9

district court.

· 10
11

The Court believes that public safety would be

better served in both of these cases by adjudicating them in the
district court.

12

They are older juveniles, 16 and 17 - years of age.

13

The extent o f the juvenile court's involvement is limited until

14

the age

15

jurisdiction is not limited.

16

the involvement of drugs, violence, particularly the use of

17

firearms and forcibly entering into a home where people therein

18

were robbed places the offense amongst the most serious in our

19

cornrnuni ty.

20

when given the facts of this case .

21

strongly protected against this activity.

22

is limited to the age of 21.

The district court's

While these were first offenses,

The like_lihood of further injury and harm is great
Society deserves to be

The Court does find that the defense has shown that it

23

is contrary to the best interest of the minors t o bind them over

24

to the jurisdiction of the district court.

25

rehabilitative services that are available in the juvenile system

There are more
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than in the adult system.

2

defendants appear to have loving families and homes that they

3

have come from.

4

succeed, and they have skill sets that show that they have many

5

capabilities.

6

nor the positive skill sets that I think both of them have, they

7

chose not to use those in . this situation.

8
9

Both of the minors, both of the

They have had opportunities in the past to

They chose not to use those.

Either the support

So the Court finds that the defense has not met its
burden of proving that it is contrary to the best interest of the

10

minor and the best interest of the public to bind the defendants

11

over to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

12

that I 've said that right.

13

of proving it is contrary to the minor's best interest, neither

14

defense has met its burden of showing that it's in the best

15

interest of the public in this inter

16

matter is bound over to the distri ct court.

17

Let me make sure

While the defense has met the burden

in this instance, and the ·

On a personal note, this is not the way that I woul d

18

want any young man to start his majority with serious offenses

19

in the adult system.

20

your actions, but I also think that it's necessary

21

accountability is necessary.

22

in front of you, and it is the Court's hope that you use this

23

experience to do -- make better decisions and choices in the

24

future as you move forward .

25

It's tough to be held accountable for
that

You still both have a lot of years

That being said, I need arrest warrants here.

Does the
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

OMNIBUS RULING AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
POST-SENTENCE MOTIONs\UG 2 9 2014

vs.

Case No. 1319025.li-a(?.__________

COOPER JOHN ANTHONY VAN

Judge Ernie W. Jor es

HUIZEN.

t=ILED
I AIJG29m 1

Defendant.

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

This matter is before the Court on Defendant, s several post-sentence
motions. In order, Defendant has presented the Court with the following motions:
1) the "Motion to Correct Sentence Imposed illegally as a Result of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel"; 2) the "Motion to Reinstate Appeal of Right from Serious
Youth Offender Bindover Order''; 3) the "Motion to Declare Mispleas or Nullify
Pleas"; 4) the ''Motion to Quash Bindover Order from Juvenile Court"; and 5) a
"Motion for Stay of Sentence Pending Appeal" combined with an "Application for
Certificate of Probable Cause." Counsel for both the State and Defendant have
1JD

fully briefed these motions and the Court has carefully considered the arguments
and law cited therein. In the interest ofjudicial efficiency, and as these motions
touch on similar themes and legal questions, the Court will address these motions
in this single omnibus ruling and order.
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BACKGROUND

Defendant, following his participation in a violent home invasion, was
charged with two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated
burglary. Defendant, a 16-year-old minor, was then bound over fromjuvenile court
to this Court to face the charges as an adult. The bind over process was conducted

in accordance with the Juvenile Court Act, specifically its provisions relating to
serious youth offenders See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702. In March of this year,
Defendant entered guilty pleas to two reduced, second-degree felony robbery
charges. On May 7, 2014, Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent 1- to 15year terms in the Utah State Prison.
Defendant, by raising several alleged deficiencies, now seeks to challenge
~e pl"Ocess by which Defendant was bound over into di~tiict court from juvenile
court; entered his plea of guilty, and a sentence was imposed. In deciding these
motions, the Court will address each motion according to its chronological relation
t<? Defendant's proceedings, rather than in the order that Defendant filed the
motion with the Court. Following the Court's analysis and ruling, the Court will
specify its respective orders.
ANALYSIS

I.

Motion to Quash Bind Over Order from Juvenile Court

First, the Court addresses Defendant's motion to quash the bind over order
from juvenile court. Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by several alleged
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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legal and structural errors that occurred during the process by which the juvenile
court bound him over to this Court. The statutory mechanisms establishing this
·bind over process are outlined below.
The Juvenile Court Act, specifically in its provisions relating to transferring
serious you~ offenders to district court, provides that juveniles may be bound over
· and held to answer to as adults in district court if the criminal information filed
against those juveniles charges them with certain types of violent offenses. See

Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702. This process is not automatic and is subject to the
state meeting its burden to establish probable cause that that the violent offense has
been committed and that the juvenile defendant committed said violent offense.
·Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3). If the state met this burden, the juvenile court
"shall order that the defendant be bound over [to the district court] ... unless the
juvenile court judge finds that it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor
and to the public ...." Id.
The factors that a juvenile court judge may rely upon in making the
determination to bind over the defendant are very specific, and the Juvenile Court
~

Act provides that a juvenile defendant may appeal a bind over order. See Utah
Code Ann. 78A-6-702(3)(c), 78A-6-704(a). On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals
then reviews the bind over order and the ''underlying factual findings made by the
juvenile judge" for "clear error'' in order to determine whether to affirm or reverse
the bind over order. State ex rel. M.E.P., 114 P.3d 596, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 2005).
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This process illustrates that it is only the appellate court that is vested with
the authority to consider and potentially quash juvenile bind over orders.
· Defendant has offered sundry arguments as to why this Court should quash the
bind over order, but such arguments to this Court are unavailing, as it possesses no
jurisdiction to issue the particular relief sought. Only the app~llate court may
consider these arguments and order the bind over order quashed if that court
determines that such action is appropriate. For lack ofjurisdiction, this Court
cannot grant such a motion.
Il.

Motion to Reinstate Appeal of Right from Serious Youth Bindover
Order
The Court now turns to Defendant's motion to reinstate the timeframe to

appeal the bind over order. Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the failure
of then-serving counsel to timely file an appeal of the bind over order and the
failure of same counsel to inform Defendant of the availability of such an appeal.
Defendant cites the Utah Supreme Court case State v. Manning in support of the
proposition that it is appropriate to reinstate appellate time when appeals of right
are defaulted by counsel and through no fault of the defendant. See State v.
Manning. 122 P.3d 628,636 (Utah 2005). The State agreed in its opposing

m~morandum that under Manning, Defendant should have his time to appeal the
bind over order reinstated.
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Manning provides that it is appropriate to reinstate a Defendant's direct
appeal right.if it can be determined that the defendant "been prevented in some
meaningful way from proceeding with a first appeal of right." Id. at 635. One of
the outlined circumstances of Manning leading to reinstatement of the direct appeal
right is that the defendant can demonstrate that ''the court or the defendant's
attorney failed to properly advise defendant of the right to appeal." Id. While the
State points out that the juvenile court bind over order clearly specified the 30-day
right to appeal that order, Defendant maintains that his counsel neither informed
the Defendant of this fact nor provided the Defendant with a copy of the bind over
~

order.
Normally a gUilty plea, such as Defendant's here, would serve as a waiver of
any alleged procedural defects with the bind over. See State v. Rhinehart, 167 P.3d
1046, 1049 (Utah 2007). However, our Supreme Court has specified that this
waiver does apply to alleged errors of a jurisdictional nature. Id. Here, had
Defendant timely appealed the bind over order, he would have been challenging
the decision of the juvenile court to confer jurisdiction over the Defendant to this

~

Court. This question, combined with the fact that Defendant has offered evidence
supporting the application of the Manning circumstances (namely that counsel
failed to advise Defendant of his right to appeal and failed to provide him with the
juvenile court order specifying the available relief) leads the Court to conclude that
reinstating Defendant's time to appeal the bind over order is appropriate.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court, however, must stress that granting Defendant's motion here does
not affect Defendant's present incarceration, as the Court's decision cannot unwind
all proceedings post-bind over order. When this Court heard the case, accepted the
plea, and announced a sentence, it did so with the understanding that it held-proper
jurisdiction via bind over order. Barring ~ appellate court decision as to the
validity of that bind over order and its effect on this Court's sentence, the Court
lacks the authority to stay the sentence in conjunction with reinstating the time to
appeal the bind over order. The appropriate procedural mechanism to stay a
sentence pending appeal is found in Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. As mentioned in the outset of this ruling, Defendant has made a motion
invoking that rule, and the Court will address the merits of that motion later in this
ruling.

·m.

Motion to Declare Mispleas or Nullify Pleas
Next the Court addresses Defendant's motion that this Court recognize

Defendant's guilty pleas as mispleas or alternatively to nullify those guilty pleas.
Defendant asserts that this Court retains the authority to declare a misplea here or
to nullify his pleas because the guilty pleas were not knowing or voluntary~ While
it is true that a trial court may withdraw a plea of guilty upon a showing that the

plea

was not knowingly or voluntarily made, such motions must be made prior to

the announcement of sentence~ Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(a)-(b). Any
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challenge to a guilty plea ''not made within the [specified] time period" can only be
pursued via request for post-conviction relief. Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(c).
Here, the Court has announced its sentence regarding the Defendant's
conviction. Accordingly, the Court possesses neither the authority to hear such a
motion nor the ability to grant the requested remedy. Defendant's arguments
regarding knowledge, volition, and their relation to his guilty pleas may only be
offered in a separate, civil petition for post-conviction relief. The Court therefore
cannot grant this motion.
IV.

Motion to Correct Sentence Imposed IDegally as a Result of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
Defendant also moves this Court, pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal

Procedure 22(e), to correct Defendant's sentence on the basis that the sentence was
'<iP

illegal. In support of this motion, Defendant offers that the sentence was illegal
due to trial counsel's ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing. Specifically,
Defendant argues that the assistance was ineffective because trial counsel failed at
the sentencing hearing to distinguish Defendant's culpability from that of his codefendants', and failed to provide the Court (for purposes of presentence reporting)
with information that Defendant alleges was essential to consider. -Despite
Defendant's strenuous argument, ineffective assistance of counsel does not serve
as grounds for declaring a sentence illegal.
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Regarding illegal sentences, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted the
definition promulgated by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. State v. Yazzie, 203
P.3d 984,988 (Utah 2009). Under that definition, a sentence is illegal if it "is
ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is
internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is
uncertain 8:8 to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment
of conviction did not authorize." United States v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515
(10th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the State points out, a
sentence is also illegal if the imposing court lacks subject matter jwisdiction. State
v. Thorkelson, 84 P.3d 854,857 (Utah Ct. App. 2004).
As the Court cannot consider Defendant's arguments of ineffective

assistance of counsel as a proper basis for declaring the sentence here illegal, it
must determine whether the any of the aforementioned, recognized grounds apply.
The Court determines that they do not. Defendant pied guilty to two counts of
robbery. Robbery is classified under Utah Code Annotated §76-6-301 as a seconddegree felony. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203, the appropriate
sentence that may be levied against a person convicted of a second degree felony is
an indeterminate term of imprisonment "not less than one year nor more than 1S
years." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203(2). Defendant's sentence here was not
ambiguous with resp~ct to time or manner. It was not internally contradictory. It
did not omit a required term imposed by statute. It was not uncertain as to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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'

substance of the sentence. It was precisely the sort of sentence authorized by the
conviction of a second-degree felony.. As previously established, the Court had
jurisdiction subsequent to the issuance of the bind over order from juvenile court.
None of the established grounds that would render a sentence illegal and require
correction under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure exist here.
Accordingly, the Court can find no basis to properly grant Defendant's motion.

V.

Motion to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal and Issue a Certificate of
Probable Cause
Finally, the Court addresses Defendant's petition for a certificate of probable

cause motion to his Motion to stay his sentence pending appeal. In order to release
a currently incarcerated defendant during the pendency of his appeal, Rule 27 of
the Utah Rule of Criminal-Procedure requires that that this Court first issue a
~

certificate of probable cause and determine by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant is not likely to flee and does not pose a danger to the 90mmunity.
Utah R. Crim. P. 27(b)(l). In order to properly issue a certificate of probable
cause, the Court must find that the Defendant's appeal is not taken for the purpose
of delay and raises substantial issues of law or fact reasonably likely to result in
reversal. Id. at (b)(3 ).
Out of the myriad arguments Defendant has made, the Court has recognized

vlD

only one as cognizant: that the Defendant may appeal the juvenile Court bind over
order due to the failure of trial counsel to apprise him of his right to appeal the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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order. However, this Court is not convinced by Defendant's arguments that it is
reasonably likely that the Court of Appeals will quash the bind over order.
Furthermore, on the basis of the clearly delineated jurisprudence that informs the
Court's analysis of Defendant's other motions, the Court is not convinced that
Defendant~ raised any substantial issues of law and fact that make it reasonably
likely that the Court of Appeals will overturn the Court's other determinations.
Specifically as to the bind over order, Defendant's argument challenges the
juvenile court judge's qualifications to hear his case and only collaterally attacks
the juvenile court's consideration of the five factors that must be analyzed when
deciding to bind over a defendant to district court. As stated previously, the
statutory provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78A-6-702(3)(c) require that juvenile
·,

court judges only consider five specific factors when making bind over
determinations. Nothing in Defendant's arguments suggests that the juvenile court
deviated from those factors and none of Defendant's proffered alternative
conclusions to each of those factors is legally or factually significant enough to call
the court's decision into question.
Furthermore, this Court is not convinced that Defendant's arguments
regarding the juvenile court judge (specifically her personal and professional
background) raise an issue of fact or law significant enough to make reversal of the
bind over reasonably certain. As the Court can find no adequate ground on this
issue, or as to the arguments supporting Defendant's other post-sentence motions,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that would warrant the issuance of a certificate of probable-cause, the Court will
refrain from issuing such a certificate.
Even if the Court were to find a basis to issue the certificate of probable
cause, the circumstances forming the basis of Defendant's conviction demonstrate
that it is not in the community's best interest to release him from incarceration.
The Defendant is serving his current sentence because he pied guilty to robbery-a

robbery accomplished through home invasion and through Defendant's provision
of firearms. These are actions and the sort of behavior that can only be
characterized as absolutely contrary to the societal interests of peace and safety.
Defendant's age does not mitigate the gravity of these actions. Indeed, the
severity of his behavior warranted charging him in district court as an adult It
would be antithetical to the interests-even safety-of the community to suspend
the operation of his sentence. Absent grounds to issue a certificate of probable
cause, and in light of the circumstances of the offense, the Court is not convinced
that it is appropriate to release defendant from- incarceration.

ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing rulings, Defendant's Motion to Reinstate

Appeal of Right from Serious Youth Bindover Order is GRANTED. All other
motions captioned and discussed herein are hereby DENIED. In accordance with
granting Defendant's Motion to Reinstate Appeal of Right from Serious Youth
Bindover Order, the 30-day period to appeal the bind over order is reinstated.
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Pursuant to Rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, any such appeal of
that bind over order must be filed within 30 days of the entry of this Order.
Dated this 2 ~ day of

.A

~,\ ~,T2014.

~ont{~..,,,,-Utah Second District Court
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~~CATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

i'!f.. day of

A,J

2014, I sent a true and con:ect

copy of the foregoing ruling to the p~es as follows:
Dee W. Smith ·
Brody E. Flint
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Weber County Attorney's Office
2380 Washington Blvd., Ste 230
Ogden, Utah 84401
Elizabeth Hunt
Attorney. for Defendant
Elizabeth Hunt LLC
569 Browning Ave.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
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EIJZA.BETH HUNT (#5292)
Attomey for Defendant/Appellant
EIJZA.BETH HUNT LLC
569 BROWNING AVE.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: (801) 706-1114
E-Facsimile: 1-801-443-1980
Email: elizabeth.hunt@comcast.net

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY,
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Case No. 131903542

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

JUDGE·ERNIE JONES

COOPERJOHN ANTHONY VAN
HUIZEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

Cooper Van Huizen, by counse~ hereby gives notice of his appeal to the Utah Court
of Appeals from this Court's omnibus ruling entered on August 29, 2014.
Respectfully submitted on August 31, 2014.

s/Eliz.abeth H11nt
EIJZABETH HUNT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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I hereby certify that on August 31, 2014, a true and correct copy of this was e-filed
and thereby served on the Weber County Attorney's Office.

bl Elitpbeth Hunt
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ELIZABETH HUNT (#5292)
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
ELIZABETH HUNT LLC
569 BROWNING AVE.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: (801) 706-1114
E-Facsimile: 1- 801-443-1980
Email: elizabeth.hunt@comcast.net
IN THE SECOND DISTRlCT COURT, WEBER COUNTY,
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO REINSTATE APPEAL OF
RIGHTFROMSERIOUSYOUTII
OFFENDER BINDOVER ORDER

v.

Case No. 131903542

COOPER JOHN ANTHONY VAN
HUIZEN,

WOGE ERNIE JONES

Defendant/Appellant.

Having considered the briefing of the parties, and good cause appearing, the Court
hereby reinstates Cooper Van Huizen's right to appeal from the bindover order of the
juvenile court following the Serious Youth Offender preliminary hearing. The notice of
appeal must be filed within thirty days of the entry of this order.
SO ORDERED this_ day of _

___. 2014.

BY THE COURT:
THE HONORABLE ERNIE JONES
JUDGE, SECOND DISTRICT COURT
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H.B. 105

1

SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER AMEND1\1ENTS

2

2013 GENERAL SESSION

3

STATE OF UTAH

4

Chief Sponsor: V. Lowry Snow

5

Senate Sponsor: Lyle W. Hillyard

6
.7

8
~

9

LONG TITLE
Gene~ Description:
This bill amends the procedure to transfer jurisdiction for a serious youth offender from

10

a juvenile court to a district court.

11

Highlighted Provisions:

12

This bill:

13

•

provides for a juvenile court judge to consider a minor's prior adjudications in

14

juvenile court, a minor's best interest, and the public's safety when determining a

15

jurisdiction transfer from a juvenile court to a district court; and

16
17
18
19
20

•

makes technical changes.

Money Appropriated in this Bill:
None

Other Special Clauses:
None

21

Utah Code Sections Affected:

22

AMENDS:

23

78A-6-702, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2012, Chapter 118

24

25

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

26

Section 1. Section 78A-6-702 is amended to read:

27

78A-6-702. Serious youth offender--Procedure.

28

(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general charging

29

a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by criminal information and filed in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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juvenile court if the information charges any of the following offenses:

31

(a) any felony violation of:

32

(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson;

33

(ii) Section 76-5-103, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury to another;

34

(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated [kidnaping] kidna1ming:

35

(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary;

36

(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery;

37

(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault;

38

(vii) Section 76-10-508.1, felony discharge of a firearm;

39

(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or

40

(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or

41

(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (l)(a) involving the use of a

42

dangerous weapon.s. which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the minor has been

43

previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon.s.

44

which also would have been a felony if committed by an adult.

45
46

(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under Subsection
(1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court.

47

(3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1), the

48

state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the burden of proof to establish

49

probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed

50

and that the defendant committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (1 )(b), the state shall have

51

the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has

52

previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous

53

weapon.

54

(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this Subsection

55

(3), the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and held to answer in the district

56

court in the same manner as an adult unless the juvenile court judge finds that [atl of the

57

following eonditt011s exist.] it would be contrmy to the best interest of the minor and to the

-2-
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public to bind over the defendant to the jurisdiction of the district court.
(c) In making the bind over determination in Subsection (3)(b), the judge shall consider

59
60

only the following:

61

(i) whether the minor has [not] been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense

62

involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an adult;

63

(ii) [that] if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, whether the

64

minor appears to have a greater or lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants; [and]

65
66

(iii) [that] the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was [not] committed in a

violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner[:']~

67

(iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in the juvenile court; and

68

(v) whether public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in the juvenile

69

court or in the district court.

[(tj]@ Once the state has met its burden under [tlm] Subsection (3).{fil as to a

70

~

~

H.B.105

71

showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going forward and

72

presenting evidence [~ to the existence of the aboive conditions] that in light of the

73

considerations listed in Subsection (3)(c), it would be contracy: to the best interest of the minor

74

and the best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district

75

court.

76

[td,] @ If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that [aH-the

77

above conditions ate satisfied,] it would be contraty to the best interest of the minor and the

78

best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district court, the

79

court shall so state in its findings and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed

80

upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition.

81

(4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but that the

82

state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind the defendant over

83

under Subsection (1 ), the juvenile court judge shall order the defendant held for trial as a minor

84

and shall proceed upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition.

85

(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest shall issue.

-3-
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86

The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be

87

advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in

88

accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail.

89

(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this section,

90

the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not include a finding of

91

probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was committed and that the defendant

92

committed it, but the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the

93

additional considerations listed in Subsection (3)(b).

94
95

(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same
information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for one or more

96 . charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same criminal episode and any
97

subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him shall be considered together with

98

those charges, and where the court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been

99

committed and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to

100
101

the district court to answer for those charges.
(8) When a minor has been bound over to the district court under this section, the

102

jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the juvenile court over the minor is

103

terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same criminal episode,

104

and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against the minor, except as provided in

105

Subsection (12).

106

(9) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court under this

107

section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not entitled to a

108

preliminary examination in the district court.

109

(10) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant has

110

previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous

111

weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the criminal offense and do not need

112

to be proven at trial in the district court.

113

(11) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed or any

-4-
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114

other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction over

115

the minor for all purposes, including sentencing.

116

(12) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice

117

Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there

118

is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court.

-5-
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on unspecified dates)

3

CHAIRMAN:

With that, our first item on the agenda will

4

be House Bill, Representative Snow.

5

time is yours.

6

MR.

SNOW:

Representative Snow, the

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

7

committee.

8

the State of Utah whereby we can or the court -- juvenile court

9

can in certain cases involving a juvenile offender certify that

The bill before you, HB105 relates to the process in

10

juvenile to the district court to stand trial as an adult, and of

11

course if found guilty, to be sentenced as an adult.

12

This amendment relates to that process.

The current

13

code provision is fairly restrictive into how -- as to how that

14

process works.

15

juvenile offenders that are 16 years of age or older.

16

the way that it proceeds is once criminal information is filed

17

for one of the offenses that are listed that are subject to being

18

certified as an adult,

19

essentially to determine whether or not there's probable causa to

20

believe that the offender has committed one of those offenses,

21

and then also as part of that, to determine whether or not the

22

juvenile offender was

23

system and has committed an offense using a dangerous weapon.

24

25

First of all,

the process only applies to
Secondly,

the Court holds a probable cause hearing,

has previously been in the juvenile

If those burdens are met, then the Court under the
current statutory scheme goes through a fairly narrow process in
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1

determining whether or not this offender ought to be certified as

2

an adult.

3

clear and convincing evidence, and the Court looks -- under the

4

current statute the Court looks at three elements: whether or not

5

this offender was previously adjudicated for an offense involving

6

a dangerous weapon, whether or not if it was that the activity

7

involved one or more co-defendants, whether or not this

8

particular minor's culpability was less than the others, and

9

whether or not there were elements of aggravated nature, a

10
11

The standard of evidence in that determination is by

violent element, aggressive or premeditated element.
Once those are met under our current code, the juvenile

12

court judge really has no discretion.

13

the way the law is written, he or she sitting as the judge must

14

certify that offender to district court, and then the offender

15

goes through adult court to face those charges.

16

there are some crimes that are so egregious and heinous in their

17

nature and by their facts that this was the reason this provision

18

exists in the code.

19

Once those are met, then

Now clearly

Now the purpose of the amendment is to keep that process

20

and that procedure in place, but to add an element of discretion

21

or a greater element of discretion in those cases where,

22

according to the amendment, it would be in the best interest

23

of the minor and the public to bind the defendant over to the

24

jurisdiction of the court -- of the district court, but must meet

25

in addition to the three elements that I've indicate.
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The Court would also have a right to look at the nature

2

and number of the prior adjudicated offenses, and also an overall

3

determination analysis, is the public safety better served by

4

adjudicating the minor in the juvenile court or in the district

5

court.

6

Seated to my right, I should -- Mr. Chairman, members of

7

the committee, I think most of you know Director Jacey Skinner,

8

who is the director for the Utah Sentencing Commission.

9

take questions on the amendment, if it's okay, Mr. Chairman, I'd

Before I

10

like to turn some time to Director Skinner to provide the

11

committee with a little more context and history as to how this

12

came about, this amendment, what the genesis was for it and why

13

the director and her board believes that this is a proper

14

amendment for the committee to consider and eventually be passed

15

into law.

16
17

18

Is that acceptable?
CHAIRMAN:

That would great.

Ms. Skinner, if you'll

just introduce yourself.
MS. SKINNER:

My name is Jacey Skinner.

As mentioned,

19

I'm the director of the Utah Sentencing Commission.

20

started, I just wanted to thank you Representative Snow for his

21

help with this particular bill.

22

helpful in helping us move those forward.

23

Before I get

He's been very dedicated and

As was mentioned, this -- this bill deals with our

24

serious youth offender statute.

25

history, I've provided a chart there.

To give you a little bit of
You should all have one.
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It's entitled Utah Juvenile Transfer and Custody Laws.

2

explains the different methods by which we currently under our

3

current law transfer juveniles from the juvenile court to the

4

criminal system or the adult system.

5

It

There are three methods.

There is one which we call just statutory jurisdiction

6

or where it's by -- by law, the crime is automatically filed in a

7

criminal court.

8

the minor is 16 years of age or older and commits an offense that

9

would me murder, aggravated murder.

These cases are fairly narrow, but they're when

Those offenses are filed

10

directly there, and there's no question there.

11

previously been transferred to the adult court -- to criminal

12

court -- any case after that point is filed in that particular

13

area.

Or if they've

14

We also have a process called certification which is

15

more of a discretionary waiver where it doesn't fall into any

16

particular type of crime, but if the prosecutor feels like

17

transfer may be warranted, they can file an information and put

18

on a certification hearing for the judge where the judge has a

19

lot of discretion to determine whether or not it's in the

20

interest of the public or in the interest of the juvenile to

21

transfer them to juvenile court.

22

Then we have in the middle what we call a presumptive

23

waiver type of a situation where

24

we're focusing on today which is called serious youth offender.

25

It's a presumptive waiver which means that for a violation of any

and this is the statute that
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of the crimes that you see listed there, that it's presumed that

2

the juvenile will be transferred.

3

mentioned, the factors that exist that the Court has to find are

4

quite narrow and very well defined.

5

the Court is asked to find -- to hold a retention factor hearing

6

in which they are asked to find some of the following

7

circumstances.

8

they must find that all of the circumstances exist, and they're

9

kind of negative findings, so I'll walk you through them.

10

Now as Mr. Representative Snow

After preliminary hearing

It's a little awkward to follow because it's --

So they -- the Court must find that the minor has not

11

been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense involving a

12

dangerous weapon.

13

committed with one or more other persons, the minor appears to

14

have a lesser degree of culpability than the co-defendants, and

15

that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a

16

violent, aggressive or premeditated manner.

17

They must also find that if the offense is

Because the Court must find all of these to exist, it's

18

really difficult for them to ever retain a juvenile.

19

give the appearance that the judges have some discretion here and

20

that they're making a decision, really, given the nature of these

21

offenses -- and these are serious offenses.

22

mean to lessen the degree of their seriousness at all.

23

So while we

I don't -- I don't

For instance, an aggravated burglary, it's very

24

difficult to commit an aggravated burglary in a non-aggressive

25

manner.

So by the very nature that the Court has found that the
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1

probable cause exists, even if the minor has not been previously

2

adjudicated delinquent for a weapon, even if there -- the offense

3

was committed in concert with more than one person and their role

4

in the crime was very minor, the fact that the crime itself was

5

aggressive means that the Court has to bind them over.

6

I became the director of this commission about four

7

years ago, and one of the very first things that my commission

8

started saying that they wanted to look at was this particular

9

statute for that reason.

All mem -- everyone involved felt

10

like their hands were kind of tied.

11

cases -- or the law says that these cases must be filed this

12

way, and the juvenile court judges have really no discretion in

13

deciding whether or not this juvenile should be transferred.

14

The Court said that these

The reason that this is frustrating for them is that

15

they really may have a juvenile who has no previous history

16

whatsoever; this is their first interaction with the juvenile

17

court.

18

of the nature of the crime, they are -- they're transferred to

19

the district court system.

Their role may have been a minor one.

20

But again, because

The prosecutors don't always think that that should be

21

the case.

22

should be the case, and the judges are often frustrated that they

23

are forced, because of the way the law is written, to transfer

24

them.

25

The defense attorneys obviously don't think that that

What happens when they are then transferred into the
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1

district court is where we -- we're giving them these harsh adult

2

sentences, is given the fact that they are very young, that they

3

have no criminal history and that their role in the offense

4

was -- may have been rather minor, we often see them being placed

5

on probation, which is not really the purpose of sending someone

6

to district court.

7

If we think about why we would be transferring someone

8

to the adult court from the juvenile court, I think there are

9

two questions that we have to ask.

First, is the harsher adult

10

sentence needed.

11

a length and duration longer than we would have jurisdiction in

12

the juvenile court needed as retribution or for public safety

13

reasons in the adult system.

14

I would characterize that is that a sentence of

Now in the juvenile court we can maintain jurisdiction

15

until a juvenile is 21-years-old.

16

offenders is that they are 16.

17

adult system, even if they are sanctioned, if they're sent to

18

prison, we find nationally that the length of stay for juvenile

19

offenders transferred to the adult system is a little over three

20

years.

21

They will still be very young when they are returned to the

22

community, and the question is, how are we going to be returning

23

them to the community.

24

25

The average age for these

When they are transferred to the

The reality is they will be returned to the community.

The next question that we have to ask is did the
transfer to adult court actually reduce the crime component or

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

1

future crime that will be committed.

2

studies of transfer laws across the country.

3

for that is in the early 'B0's and the early '90's, which is

4

or excuse me, the late '80's, early '90's, which is when our law

5

was passed as well in its current form, I should say, there was a

6

serious increase in concern about juvenile crime in the country,

7

particularly a lot of offenders who were repeat offenders and

8

very serious.

9

they expected these juveniles to become just very serious

There have been a lot of
One of the reasons

They kind of coined the phrase super predator, and

10

dangerous criminals, and so these laws were passed to remove them

11

from the juvenile court system, to deal with them in the adult

12

system, and to -- essentially the plan was to lock them up for a

13

very long period of time.

14

What we've seen since that time is that that forecast

15

hasn't really played out.

16

significantly, and what we found is that the transfer to the

17

adult system hasn't really paid off the way that we anticipated

18

that it would.

19

In fact,

the cases have diminished

For instance, soon after our law was passed, we started

20

having questions as to whether or not it was effective.

21

Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice's study of the

22

serious youth offender and transfer cases.

23

were 65 juveniles that were identified as serious youth

24

offenders.

25

about half of them were placed on probation in 2002.

In 2002

In that year there

I can go through what happened there.

In that case
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1

Looking at the same cases for last year, we were able to

2

identify 11 total transfer cases -- now that included -- that

3

includes certification cases and serious youth offender cases.

4

There were five total serious youth offender cases last year.

5

So as we can see, these cases have dropped off

6

dramatically.

7

two of them were placed on probation.

8

on probation were -- when we look at their offenses, we can

9

assume that the judge looked at the case and said, again, this is

10

not a serious enough of an offense -- or not offense, but doesn't

11

warrant a prison sentence in this particular instance.

12

are lots of things that a district court judge takes into play

13

when they're making that sentence.

14

Out of those, three of them were placed in prison,
The two that were placed

So there

What we are trying to do with this particular amendment

15

is to not change that system altogether.

16

are very serious crimes that are committed by young people in our

17

community.

18

the juvenile court system.

19

for public safety reasons being transferred.

20

you'll always here with these laws is that they were created to

21

deal with the juveniles, the worst of the worst, and those who

22

had exhausted the resources of the juvenile court system.

23

We recognize that there

Some of those cannot be dealt with appropriately in
Some of them -- some of them warrant
The phrase that

As we can see through these factors that exist right

24

now, the juvenile's history doesn't really come into play.

25

can be the juvenile's first offense, their first interaction with

It
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1

the court system, and they could end up being transferred.

2

that exhausting the resources of the juvenile court system

3

doesn't become a factor.

4

So.

The worst of the worst does come into play with these

5

are the worst offenses that we do see, but it doesn't necessarily

6

mean that the minor's role was the worst in them.

7

know, different facts come into each particular scenario, and we

8

need to be able to look at them.

As you all

9

My commission, as you know, is charged with maintaining

10

maximum discretion for and encouraging discretion for sentencing

11

judges.

12

need to make some improvement.

13

just that, is to provide that -- that discretion in making those

14

decisions.

15

This is one of those areas where we feel like we really
So this amendment is trying to do

As you can see, rather than a shall bind them over if

16

all of the following factors are found, the standard becomes --

17

and this is in line 57 -- they shall bind them over unless the

18

Court finds it will be contrary to the best interest of the minor

19

and the public not to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction

20

of the district court.

21

That is an and.

So we are looking at both of these -- both of these

22

factors coming into play, particularly when I asked the two

23

questions before one can ask, how is it in the best interest of

24

the public not to bind them over.

25

will be much better served in the juvenile court system where we

We may find that the juvenile
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1

can provide them services that do very well at reducing

2

recidivism rather than transferring them to a system that is not

3

equipped to deal with juveniles, particularly if they are placed

4

on probation, they're not going to receive those services that

5

may help reduce their criminogenic needs in the same way that

6

they would be able to receive in the juvenile court system.

7

In reviewing transfer laws, we do find that particular

8

for violent offenses, a juvenile who is maintained in the

9

juvenile court system versus a juvenile that's transferred to the

10

criminal system or the adult system, we find consistently that

11

those who are transferred to the adult system for violent

12

offenses reoffend more frequently and sooner than those who are

13

maintained in the juvenile court system.

14

So again, recognizing that we do have a need in some

15

instances to make these transfers, we want to make sure that that

16

can happen, but we want to give the judge the opportunity to look

17

at this particular minor, their interaction with the juvenile

18

court system before, the nature of the offense before them, and

19

to make an appropriate decision as to whether or not the public

20

and the minor would be best served in the juvenile court or in

21

the criminal court system.

22

questions.

23

24
25

CHAIRMAN:
a question here.

With that, I think I'd be open to any

Thank you very much, Ms. Skinner.

I do have

Representative Aaron?

MS. AARON:

Thank you.

Just first question, when you
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1

talk about line 58, you -- both times you referred to that line

2

you said not to bindover.

3

want to make sure we're clear on that.

4
5

MS. SKINNER:

MS. AARON:

7

MS. SKINNER:

9

I

They will bindover if they find that

it -- or excuse me, unless -- there's an unless there on 56.

6

8

Yes.

There's no not in that sentence.

Right.
So unless they find it would be contrary

to the interest of the minor and to the public.
MS. AARON:

Thank you.

Could you tell me a little bit

10

about your studies in terms of -- I know some of these have an

11

age limit of 14, some of them have 16.

12

analysis of that in terms of how often they've bound over?

13

MS. SKINNER:

Have you done any

These are age limits for the statutes

14

themselves, so because of the different nature of the statutes,

15

it -- the presumption is a little bit different.

16

certification cases aren't filed nearly as frequently.

17

14 years of age or older.

18

are -- are filed.

So
This is

They're not filed as frequently, but

19

When they are, cases that I looked at from last year,

20

they were all bound over, but I don't have -- I can't say with

21

I can't say that there weren't others that were considered to be

22

filed that way that -- this isn't making any sense as I'm saying

23

this, but those numbers didn't show up because they didn't reach

24

the transfer level, and so they maintained themselves in the

25

juvenile court system.
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So those that we looked over and in talking with

2

prosecutors and defense attorneys, I'm not aware of any from last

3

year -- I can say that -- that were not bound over.

4

usually at -- done after giving a lot of thought and large

5

hearings that are placed on.

6

Those are

With the serious youth offender, again it does -- pardon

7

me.

8

that are bound over that we're looking at.

9

this comes from both judges and from prosecutors is that when

It does depend on their age.

Now again, these are the cases
What we do know, and

10

they look at a child, one who may be younger or has lesser

11

culpability, that oftentimes because the statute is so

12

restrictive, they're finding other ways to make their way around

13

the statute.

14

the list, or they will come to some other kind of agreement in

15

order to avoid this, because the statute really does require that

16

transfer.

So they'll file one of the charges that is not on

Does that answer your question?

17

MS. AARON:

18

CHAIRMAN:

19
20

Yes, it does.

Do we have any other questions?

Representative Hall?
MR. HALL:

Could you just discuss the fiscal note that

21

we have related to this bill?

22

Representative Snow.

23

Thank you very much.

MS. SKINNER:

I don't -- either Ms. Skinner or

There is a fiscal note on the bill.

24

is coming from juvenile justice services.

25

that -- a couple of things.

This

They are estimating

They're estimating that with the --
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with the change to the statute that there will be more cases

2

filed.

3

will give some discretion.

4

outside of the statute in an effort to avoid the requirements

5

will now be filed under the particular statute, so the cases may

6

increase.

7

I can only assume that this would be because the statute
Those cases that are now being filed

What I can tell you, though, is that they are cases that

8

if they're trying to avoid the statute to begin with, I think

9

they're the cases that both the prosecutor and the judge feel

10

like may be retained under this particular statute given that

11

option.

12

that are already staying in the juvenile court system.

13

So I don't think that it would increase.

Those are kids

What JJS is estimating is that with this statute there

14

will be juveniles who are currently being sent to the district

15

court system who will be maintained in the juvenile court system,

16

and accordingly, they will need to provide services for those

17

juveniles.

18

estimating that most of those will go to secure care.

19

their estimate.

20
21
22

So that's what the fiscal note is based on.

MR. HALL:

They're
That is

Do you have any reason to disagree with the

amount?
MS. SKINNER:

It's really hard to know.

As I said

23

before, we don't know how many cases will -- each year the cases

24

differ, and we do expect that they will be changed a little bit.

25

In my -- in looking at the cases that have been filed over the
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last few years, we do have a large number of those cases where

2

the juveniles really do~'t have any prior history at all.

3

When they are transferred to the adult system, their cases are

4

greatly -- in the course of a plea bargain greatly reduced.

5

Like I said, they're placed on probation in many

6

cases.

7

offenders, and it's hard to know what would happen with them in

8

the juvenile court system, if the Court would them to secure

9

care, and if all of these juveniles are retained and are sent to

10
11

Those juveniles are what I would classify as lower risk

secure care, then that probably is an accurate estimate.
If they are not, if they are retained and placed on

12

probation or given some other services, to that

13

the fiscal note would arise to that amount.

14

I don't think

It's also, as I said, difficult to know the numbers.

15

They're estimating -- I can't remember if it's four or six

16

juveniles that will be retained in addition to those that are

17

currently retained.

18

cases total, and so it's hard to know where those will coming

19

from -- will be coming from.

20

MR. HALL:

21

MR. LOWRY:

As I said, last year we had a total of five

Thank you.
Can I weigh on that a little bit, too?

I

22

certainly don't have the background that the director has, but I

23

think the feeling is anecdotally that for those whose -- when

24

jurisdiction is transferred to the district court and those

25

juveniles or those offenders are placed on probation, the
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probation department for adults is really not equipped to deal

2

specifically or as well for juvenile offenders as juvenile

3

probation officers.

4

id

VJJ/11

So while there may be some savings at that point,

5

ultimately there is a high risk that we're going to see those

6

folks back into the system, as Ms. Skinner as already alluded to.

7

So ultimately, and in the long run we think that there is a good

8

chance that the State is going to spend more money as those youth

9

offenders mature and they -- and their issues are not addressed,

10

we're going to see them again and it's going to cost more money

11

in the long run.

Does that make sense?

12

MR. HALL:

Sure.

13

CHAIRMAN:

Any other questions?

Thank you.
I have one as the

14

chair.

15

about juvenile court -- or juvenile facilities being shut down.

16

Will -- on the fiscal note, are we going to be able to help the

17

juvenile facility folks be able to deal with some of the issues

18

that we're so concerned with in not shutting some of these

19

facilities down and giving them the resources to deal with the

20

problems that they don't have?

21

MS. SKINNER:

I'm just curious, I mean I know we've been talking a lot

Do you happen to know?

I'm sure any resources that are allotted

22

to their system will be helpful in helping them maintain this.

23

These -- the estimates here are for juveniles that are placed in

24

secure care and in community based placements.

25

estimates that they maintain.

Those are the

I'm not sure if the money that

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-~

-181

would be dedicated based on this particular offense would be

2

dedicated to those facilities or those programs, or if they could

3

be used for some of the other programs.

4

would -- how that would play out.

5

CHAIRMAN:

I'm not sure how that

I can find out for you.

That would be great.

The other concern I

6

would have is -- I mean there's been talk last year, we almost

7

had one of our facilities shut down, and obviously we're going

8

this direction, which I think is a worthy direction to go in, but

9

if you suddenly shut down a facility and then we'd have no place

10

to put these -- these youth, that creates a huge bind in our

11

system, so I'm just kind of -- wanted to make sure on that.

12

MS. SKINNER:

13

CHAIRMAN:

It does, yes.

Any other questions?

Do we have anybody in

14

the audience that would like to address this issue?

15

forward and state your name.

16

MR. GORDON:

Please come

I'm Ron Gordon, the executive director of

17

the commission on criminal and juvenile justice.

18

serious youth offender law was passed in 1996.

19

involved in the law at that time, and we've remained involved

20

with this while over the course of those intervening 17 years.

21

The original
My office was

We've made a number of relatively minor changes to the

22

law over the -- that time, and I'm here today in support.

23

commission, my office supports this bill as an important change

24

to ensure the integrity of the serious youth offender law.

25

My

The point of the law is to find appropriate ways to
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address the most serious juveniles, and the current law does not

2

allow adequate flexibility.

3

is bringing forth strikes a very delicate balance between

4

providing additional discretion to juvenile court judges in

5

certain circumstances, while also maintaining public safety.

6

focus of the bill remains public safety.

7

So the bill that Representative Snow

The

A juvenile court judge is not permitted to retain a

8

juvenile if that harms public safety or is not in the best

9

interest of public safety.

It does permit the juvenile court

10

some discretion to retain some juveniles when it is not a threat

11

to the public safety and will provide in better services being

12

delivered to that juvenile, which only increases the overall

13

public safety.

14

So my commission stands in full support of the bill.

15

We extend appreciation to Representative Snow for bringing this

16

forward to the sentencing commission for studying it over many

17

years, and as I said bef~re, it strikes a delicate balance

18

between the discretion that's necessary to make these very

19

difficult decisions while also maintaining public safety.

20
21

22

CHAIRMAN:

Thank you.

Seeing none, thank you.
MR. BOYDEN:

Any questions for Mr. Gordon?

Anybody else?

Oh, yes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Paul Boyden,

23

executive director of Statewide Association of Prosecutors.

24

have been involved in this issue, obviously, for a long time.

25

helped draft the original 18 years ago, and these retention
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factors have been a concern all along.

2

sentencing commission, and of course involved with the prosecutor

3

for that length of time.

4

This is not a minor change.

I've been on the

This is significant.

We're

5

talking about changing these factors so that the Court

6

the discretion goes to the Court, because de facto the way it

7

operates right now is the prosecutors are kind of making the

8

decision on what to charge as to whether this is going to end up

9

in the adult court or the juvenile court.

10

Nobody likes to give up power, of course.

so that

That would

11

include prosecutors, but we do understand that this is the kind

12

of thing where really the judges need a little more discretion on

13

this kind of thing.

14

factors because they just are -- they have been a problem all

15

along, and so we really need to deal with those issues.

16

We need to -- we need to adjust these

The big concern we have is we just -- we're trusting the

17

juvenile court judges at this time to make those decisions, and

18

particularly to take into account the needs of the public because

19

in criminal prosecution, it's very important for the public to

20

feel that justice is being done.

21

juveniles should be tried as adults, and that's an important

22

issue for justice to be done.

23

In some cases they feel that

So we're probably never going to be entirely through

24

with tweaking these issues, but we certainly don't oppose this.

25

We've been involved in the process all along for a very long
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1
2

time.

Thank you.
CHAIRMAN:

Thank you, Mr. Boyden.

Do we have any

3

questions?

4

not, I'll bring it back to the committee for any other clarifying

5

questions.

6

summation.

7

No.

Thank you.

Anyone else from the audience?

If

If not, we'll go back to Representative Snow for

MR. SNOW:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to say that

8

I appreciate Director Skinner and for all of her work and the

9

work of the commission and all those who have helped coordinate

10

on drafting this bill.

11

they have indicated -- those that have spoke today -- this is

12

something that's been thought through for a long period of time.

13

It's supported by Statewide Association of Prosecutors, CCJJ,

14

Utah Sentencing Commission and the Council of Juvenile Court

15

Judges in this state, so it has -- it has broad support.

16

This has been a long process, and I think

It's a good change.

It allows in a very narrow

17

situation discretion on the part of the juvenile court judges

18

and by the way, we have some great judges sitting on our juvenile

19

court benches.

20

in whether in making a proper decision on whether or not to

21

transfer jurisdiction to adult court in those situations where

22

the best interests of the public will be served, as well as the

23

best interests of the minor.

24

appropriate change.

25

policy, and I would look for support from the committee.

It offers in a very narrow situation discretion

So I believe that it's an

It's a good change in our judicial criminal
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you, Mr. Chairman.

2

(Conclusion of Mr. Snow's comments)

3

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

4

MADAME CLERK:

5

amendments.

House Bill 105.

House Bill 105, serious youth offender

Senator Hillyard?

6

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

7

MR. HILLYARD:

Senator Hillyard?

In juvenile court we have a provision for

8

serious youth offenders which requires them to be certified as

9

adults, and it's usually somebody 16, 17-years-old who have

10

committed a horrific crime.

11

statute has been drawn it's pretty well automatic.

12

amendment makes it more discretionary with the Court, because

13

some of the kids are being certified over.

14

adult court are just released on probation and not given help

15

that the juvenile court can give and structure to do.

16

The problem has been the way the
This

When they get in

So this is brought to us by the CCJJ in a leveling

17

influence to allow a little bit more discretion in the juvenile

18

court to make sure that the people who should be punished are

19

punished, and those who may need some treatment (inaudible)

20

process have that opportunity.

21

questions.

22
23

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

Be glad to respond to any

Thank you, Senator.

Questions for

Senator Hillyard?

24

MR. HILLYARD:

25

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

I'll call for question on the bill.
Seeing none -- and the question is
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1

shall House Bill 105 pass?

Roll call vote.

2

(Conclusion of Senator Hillyard's remarks)

3

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

4

MADAME CLERK:

5

amendments, Representative Snow.

6

judiciary with a vote of 7-0-2.

House Bill 105, serious youth offender

7

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

8

MR. SNOW:

9

Madame reading clerk?

This bill was heard in

Representative Snow.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern.

As this body

knows, our criminal justice system in the State of Utah is

10

divided into two parts, one that deals with adult offenders and

11

one that deals with juvenile offenders.

12

deals with juvenile offenders whose crimes alleged are serious

13

enough that a prosecutor who is prosecuting those may feel

14

inclined to transfer them to adult court to stand trial as an

15

adult and ultimately be sentenced, and perhaps even incarcerated

16

as an adult.

17

This particular bill

Now currently in Utah there are three ways that can be

18

accomplished.

19

process, and let me tell you why I'm bringing the bill.

20

that process as it exists today, an offender -- a youth offender

21

who qualifies, over the age of 16, and who has committed one of

22

the offenses enumerated, fairly serious offenses at lines 31

23

through 44, his case or her case can be transferred to adult

24

court after a hearing i~ held in juvenile court before the

25

juvenile court judge, and as long as certain elements are met.

House Bill 105 deals only with one particular
Under
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Now if those elements are met, the juvenile court judge

2

sitting and hearing the case has no discretion except to bind

3

that young person over to stand trial as an adult.

4

rigidity in the bill that prompts me bringing -- or excuse me, it

5

is that rigidity in the existing law that prompts me bringing

6

this bill.

7

It is that

Now I will tell you that this bill that is before you

8

has been worked on at least for two years.

9

the commission on criminal and juvenile justice, the Utah

It is supported by

10

sentencing commission, the Utah Juvenile Justice Service, and

11

also by the Statewide Association of Prosecutors.

12

What does the bill do?

It keeps in place the procedure

13

where those who have been charged with serious offenses can still

14

be transferred to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court;

15

however, it broadens the discretion of the Court.

16

Now why is that necessary?

Under the current rigid

17

structure, we actually have unintended consequences where a

18

juvenile under this scenario who meets those requirements, maybe

19

has very limited involvement with the juvenile court previously,

20

but meets those elements, could be transferred to the district

21

court, and either plead guilty or be found guilty and then stand

22

before that Court for sentencing.

23

The problem with the current system is the -- if the

24

offense is not of such a magnitude that the Court would be

25

inclined to impose a jail sentence or imprisonment on that
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1

juvenile, the Court most likely is inclined to order probation.

2

The problem with that scenario is our adult probation in this

3

state is not really equipped to deal with a juvenile -- juvenile

4

supervision.

5

As a result, and as an unintended consequence,

6

those serious youth offenders who then are transferred to a

7

probation -- adult probation -- have very limited supervision.

8

Their supervision terminates after a period of time, and the

9

youth offender is not really -- and his or her issues are not

10

really addressed, at least to the same extent that they would be

11

under a juvenile court supervised probation.

12

Now the standard by which a juvenile court judge making

13

that determination is fairly significant.

14

judge before they would retain this offender in juvenile court

15

would have to make two findings, one that it's in the best

16

interest of the juvenile, that jurisdiction be retained in the

17

juvenile court, and the second, that it's in the best interest of

18

the safety and welfare of the citizens of this state.

19

fairly narrow band in which a juvenile offender would -- who had

20

committed some serious offense whose jurisdiction would be

21

retained.

The juvenile court

So it's a

22

The benefit would be on retention in the juvenile court

23

system whether it -- whether it required detention or whether it

24

required supervision is our system in this state is then able to

25

address the needs of that juvenile, and the likelihood of
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1

reoffending is much less.

2

the country that in cases where a juvenile is tried as an adult

3

and then is put on probation as an adult -- under adult

4

supervision, the recidivism, the rate at which they reoffend is

5

higher than if that same juvenile were maintained under the

6

jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

7

In fact, the statistics show across

Now that's a lot of talking to say that this bill

8

provides additional discretion to our juvenile court judges to

9

make the right decision in deciding whether or not to transfer a

10

juvenile offender for serious offenses to the district court to

11

stand trial or to be sentenced.

12

Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern.

13
14

15
16

SPEAKER PRO TEM:
Discussion to the bill?
MR. KING:

Representative King?
Will the
~

sponsor yield?
SPEAKER PRO TEM:

18

MR. LOWRY:

19

MR. KING:

21

Thank you, Representative Snow.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern.

17

20

I'm ready to take questions.

Will the sponsor yield?

Yes, sure.
If you could, Representative, could you

explain for us the fiscal note?
MR. LOWRY:

There is a fiscal note that is appended to

22

this bill, and I think if you -- you each have a copy of that.

23

The fiscal bill current impact appears based on meetings that has

24

been held with the fiscal analyst as recently as this afternoon

25

is that that impact is probably going to be reduced, and I
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don't -- you don't have it front of you in writing, but I believe

2

it's going to be reduced to about $50,000.

3

Now it is true there is an impact, but if we -- we have

4

to decide, I suppose, from policy standpoint whether or not the

5

long term costs and risks associated with moving those juvenile

6

offenders who commit serious offenses to the adult system, their

7

chances of reoffending, and there's a saying among juvenile court

8

officers and those who supervise juveniles, and it goes something

9

like this.

Once we take a juvenile and we put them in a certain

10

environment -- in jail or in prison with adults, criminals -- you

11

have almost certainly created another criminal and a serious

12

criminal once that juvenile is released.

13

So while it is true that, Representative, that there is

14

a fiscal note, my understanding is No. 1, it can be mitigated,

15

and No. 2, it's my position that this is a good policy, and we'll

16

have to deal with that, but it's good policy for the State in the

17

long run to assume that cost rather than creating long range

18

issues that we're going to have to deal with later.

19

MR. KING:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern.

I want to

20

address that point.

21

look carefully at the fiscal note is there is some savings to the

22

cost of administering the adult justice system because of this,

23

and there is some additional expenditure to the juvenile justice

24

system.

25

more money on the juvenile justice system with these kids.

One of the things that you'd look at if you

I don't -- it's not troubling to me that we're spending
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2

think this is a great bill.
I commend the bill sponsor for his work on this because

3

giving greater discretion to keep juveniles out of the adult

4

system who should in the minds of those working in the juvenile

5

system be kept in the juvenile system is

6

likelihood that we're going to be able to have those kids given

7

the resources that they need to keep them from reoffender, to

8

keep them from recidivating.

That's a positive thing.

This is,

9

in my mind, an investment in the future of these kids.

I'm glad

increases the

10

to hear that the fiscal note is lower than what the bill sponsor

11

originally obtained.

12

I think that's a good thing, but I don't want the body

13

to be deterred by the existence of a fiscal note at all, because

14

the resources that we're talking about are going in to helping

15

rehabilitate these kids before they become habitual offenders or

16

become -- or before they become adults.

17

your support of this bill.

18
19
20

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

So I would encourage

Thank you.
Further discussion to the bill,

Representative Mciff?
MR. MCIFF:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern.

I wish to

21

offer a simple analogy to make a point.

22

horseman, you have to know when to pull back on the reins and

23

when to ease off, but you can never know that until you're in

24

the saddle and you see what the horse does.

25

applies to young people.

If you want to be a good

That same concept

It is impossible for us to statutorily
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1

fix whether a youth should be tried as an adult or as a juvenile,

2

and that decision cannot be fairly and realistically made until

3

you're in the saddle, and the youth is before the Court, the

4

Court can evaluate all the considerations related to this young

5

person and the offense that's been committed.

~

is sound public policy, and we should support the bill.

7

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

8

discussion to the bill?

9

summation.

10

MR. SNOW:

So I agree, this

Representative Mciff.
Seeing none,

Thank you.

Further

Representative Snow for

In summary, No. 1, this does not

11

change or do away with the process that we have in our state

12

where some serious youth offenders ought to be tried as an adult,

13

and in some cases in very egregious cases ought to -- ought to be

14

incarcerated as an adult.

15

That still remains in place.

The second thing, this bill, as has been mentioned,

16

provides some discretion -- addition discretion to juvenile court

17

judges to help make a decision that's in the best interest of the

18

person charged, but also in the best interests of the public.

19

The third thing that I'd mention with respect to the fiscal bill,

20

one way or another, whether that juvenile is going to supervised

21

or incarcerated as an adult or supervised as a juvenile, there is

22

going to be a cost.

23

There is a little more -- there is -- not a little more.

24

There is a greater cost in the structure that we build with

25

respect to supervising and rehabilitating juveniles, but in the
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1

long run, I believe it's money well spent in the state, and I

2

urge your support.

3

4
5

Thank you, Mr. Speaker pro tern.

SPEAKER PRO TEM:

Thank you, Representative Snow.

Voting is open on House Bill 105.
(Conclusion of Mr. Lowry's statements)
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Constitution of Utah, Article I§ 7
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law
United States Constitution, Amendment V
Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

United States Constitution, Amendment VI
Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public

trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1
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Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-222

78A-2-222. Disqualification for interest or relation to parties.
(1) Except by consent of all parties, a justice, judge, or justice court judge may
not sit or act in any action or proceeding.
(a) to which he is a party, or in which he is interested;
(b) when he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the
third degree, computed according to the rules of the common law; or
(c) when he has been attorney or counsel for either party in the action or
proceeding.
(2) The provisions of this section do not apply to the arrangement of the
calendar or the regulation of the order of business, nor to the power of transferring
the action or proceeding to some other court.
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103

78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue
all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or

(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) (i) a final order or decree resulting from:
(A) a formal adjudicative proceeding of a state agency; or

(B) a permit review adjudicative proceeding, as defined in Section 19-1301.5; or
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(ii) an appeal from the district court review of an infonnal adjudicative
proceeding of an agency other than the following:
(A) the Public Service Commission;

(B) the State Tax Commission;

(q the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(D) the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, for an action
reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources;
(E) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or

(F) the state engineer;

(b) appeals from the district court review of.
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state
or other local agencies; and

(rl) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;

(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or
capital felony;

(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;

(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but
not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support,
parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;

(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and

G) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of
the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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Utah Code Ann.§ 78a-6-702(2012)
78A-6-702
o

Serious youth offender -- Procedure.

o

(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general
charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by criminal
information and filed in the juvenile court if the information charges any of the
following offenses:
•

(a) any felony violation of:
•

(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson;

•

(ii) Section 76-5-103, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily
injury to another;

•

(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping;

• (iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary;
•. (v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery;

•

•
•
•
•
(b)

(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault;
(vii) Section 76-10-508.1, felony discharge of a firearm;
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or
an offense other than those listed in Subsection (l)(a) involving the use

of a dangerous weapon which would be· a felony if committed by an adult,
and the minor has been previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense
involving the. use of a dangerous weapon which also would have been a
felony if committed by an adult.
o

(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under
Subsection (1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the
Utah Supreme Court.

0

(3)

•

(a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection
(1), the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the
burden of proof to establish probable cause to believe that one of the
crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed and that the defendant
committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (l)(b), the state shall have the
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additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense
involving the use of a dangerous weapon.

•

(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this
Subsection (3), the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and
held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult unless
the juvenile court judge finds that all of the following conditions exist

•

(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a
felony if committed by an adult;

•

(ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other persons,
the minor appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than the
codefendants; and

•

(iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a
violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner.

•

(c) Once the state has met its burden under this Subsection (3) as to a
showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going
forward and presenting evidence as to the existence of the above
conditions.

•

(d) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that
all the above conditions are satisfied, the court shall so state in its findings
and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the
information as though it were a juvenile petition.

o

( 4)

If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but

that the state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind
the defendant over under Subsection (1 ), the juvenile court judge shall order the
defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the infonnation as
though it were a juvenile petition.
o

(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest shall
issue. The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal
defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The
juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail.

o

(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this
section, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not
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include a finding of probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was
committed and that the defendant committed it, but the juvenile court shall
proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional considerations
listed in Subsection (3) (b).
o

(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same
infonnation or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for
one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same
criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against
him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the court finds
probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed and that the
defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to the
district court to answer for those charges.

o

(8) When a minor has been bound over to the district court under this section,
the jurisdiction of the Division ofJuvenile Justice Services and the juvenile court
over the minor is terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising
from the same criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies
charged against the minor, except as provided in Subsection (12).

o

(9) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court under
this section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not
entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court.

o

(10) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant
has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a
dangerous weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the

criminal offense and do not need to be proven at trial in the district court.
o

(11) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed or
any other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court
retains jurisdiction over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing.

o

(12) The juvenile court und_er Section 78A-6-103 and the Division ofJuvenile
Justice Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over
the minor when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all
charges in the district court.
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Utah Code Ann. § 78a-6-702(2013)

•
o

Serious youth offender -- Procedure.

o

(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general
charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by criminal
information and filed in the juvenile court if the information charges any of the
following offenses:
•

(a) any felony violation of:

•

(i) Section 7 6-6-103, aggravated arson;

•

(ii) Section 76-5-103, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily
injury to another;

•

•

(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnapping;

•

(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary;

•

(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery;

•

(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault;

•

(vii) Section 76-10-508.1, felony discharge of a fireann;

•

(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or

•

(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or

(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (1)(a) involving the use
of a dangerous weapon [)which would be a felony if committed by an
adult, and the minor has been previously adjudicated or convicted of an
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon ill]which also would have
been a felony if committed by an adult.

o

(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under
Subsection (1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the
Utah Supreme Court.

0

(3)

• (a) If the infonnation alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection
(1 ), the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the
burden of proof to establish probable cause to believe that one of the
crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed and that the defendant
committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (1)(b), the state shall have the
additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
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defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense
involving the use of a dangerous weapon.

•

(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this
Subsection (3), the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and
held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult unless
the juvenile court judge finds it would be contrary to the best interest of the
minor and to the public to bind over the defendant to the jurisdiction of the
district court.

•

(c) In making the bind over detennination in Subsection (3)(b), the judge
shall consider only the following:
• (i) whether the minor has been previously adjudicated delinquent for
an offense inv:olving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a
felony if committed by an adult;
• (ii) if the offense was committed with one or more other persons,
whether the minor appears to have a greater or lesser degree of
culpability than the codefendants;
• (iii) the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was committed
in a violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner;
• (iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in the
juvenile court; and
•

(v) whether public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in
the juvenile court or in the district court.

• (d) Once the state has met its burden under this Subsection (3)(a) s to
a showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of
going forward and presenting evidence that in light of the
considerations listed in Subsection (3)(c), it would be contrary to the
best interest of the minor and the best interests of the public to bind
the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district court.
•

(e) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence
that it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor and the bet
interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of
the district court, the court shall so state in its findings and order the
minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the information
as though it were a juvenile petition.
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o

( 4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but

that the state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind
the defendant over under Subsection (1 ), the juvenile court judge shall order the
defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the infonnation as
though it were a juvenile petition.
o

(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest shall
issue. The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal
defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The
juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail.

o

(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this
section, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not
include a finding of probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was
committed and that the defendant committed it, but the juvenile court shall
proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional considerations
listed in Subsection (3)(b).

o

(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple crinunal offenses in the same
infonnation or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for
one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same

criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against
him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the court finds
probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed and that the
defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to the
district court to answer for those charges.
o

(8) When a minor has been bound over to the district court under this section,
the jurisdiction of the Division ofJuvenile Justice Services and the juvenile court
over the minor is terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising
from the same criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies
charged against the minor, except as provided in Subsection (12).

o

(9) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court under
this section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not
entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court.

o

(10) Allegations contained in the indictment or infonnation that the defendant
has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a
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dangerous weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the
o

criminal offense and do not need to be proven at trial in the district court.
(11) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed or
any other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court
retains jurisdiction over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing.

o

(12) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-703 and the Division ofJuvenile
Justice Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over
the minor when there is an acquitta~ a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all
charges in the district court.

Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-6-704

78A-6-704. Appeals from serious youth offender and certification
proceedings.
(1) A minor may, as a matter of right, appeal from:
(a) an order of the juvenile court binding the minor over to the district court as a
serious youth offender pursuant to Section 78.A-6-702; or

(b) an order of the juvenile court, after certification proceedings pursuant to
Section 78A-6-703, directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings
in the district court.
(2) The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from:
(a) an order of the juvenile court that a minor charged as a serious youth offender
pursuant to Section 78A-6-702 be held for trial in the juvenile court; or

(b) a refusal by the juvenile court, after certification procee~gs pursuant to
Section 78A-6-703, to order that a minor be held for criminal proceedings in
the district court.

Utah Code ofJudicial Conduct, Preamble

PREAMBLE
[1] An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of
justice. The United States legal system is based upon the principle that an
independent, impartial, and competent judiciary, composed of men and women of
integrity, will interpret and apply the law that governs our society. Thus, the judiciary
plays a central role in preserving the principles of justice and the rule of law. Inherent
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in all the Rules contained in this Code are the precepts that judges, individually and
collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to
maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system.

[2] Judges should maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times and should
avoid both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and
personal lives. They should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest
possible public confidence in their independence, impartiality, integrity, and
competence.
[3] The Utah Code of Judicial Conduct establishes standards for the ethical
conduct of judges and judicial candidates. It is not intended as an exhaustive guide
for the conduct of judges and judicial candidates, who are govemed in their judicial
and personal conduct by general ethical standards, as well as by the Code. The Code
is intended, however, to provide guidance and assist judges in maintaining the highest
standards of judicial and personal conduct and to provide a basis for regulating their
conduct through the judicial disciplinary system.

Utah Code ofJudicial Conduct, Canon 1

CANON1
A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD AND PROMOTE THE
INDEPENDENCE,* INTEGRITY,*AND IMPARTIALITY*OF THE
JUDICIARY AND SHALL AVOID IMPROPRIETY* AND THE
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY.

Utah Code ofJudicial Conduct, Rule 1.2

RULE1.2

Promo#ng Confidsn&e in tbs J•di&ia,y
A judge should act at all times in a manner that promotes-and shall not
undermine-public confidence in the independence* integrity,* and
impartiality* of the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety* and
the appearance of impropriety.

Utah Code ofJudicial Conduct, Canon 2

CANON2
A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE
IMPARTIALLY,* COMPETENTLY, AND DILIGENTLY.
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Utah Code ofJudicial Conduct, Rule 2.2
he justice system.

RULE2.2

Impartiality* and Fairness
A judge shall uphold and apply the law,* and shall perform all duties of
judicial office fairly and impartially.

Utah Code ofJudicial Conduct, Rule 2.3

Bias, Prej11di&e, and Harassment*
(A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including
administrative duties, without bias or prejudice.
(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or
conduct manifest bias or prejudice or engage in harassment, including but not
limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex, gender,
religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital
status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation, and shall not permit court
staff, court officials, or others subject to the judge's direction and control to do
so.

(C) A judge shall take reasonable measures to require lawyers in
proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice, or
engaging in harassment, based upon attributes including but not limited to
race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual
orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation,
against parties, witnesses, lawyers, or others.
(D) The restrictions of paragraphs (B) and (C) do not preclude judges or
lawyers from making legitimate reference to the listed factors, or similar
factors, when they are relevant to an issue in a proceeding.

Utah Code ofJudicial Conduct, Rule 2.4

RULE2.4

External Inf/11,n&es on ]11dicial Cond11&t
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(A) A judge shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism.
(B) A judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or other
interests or relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or
··
judgment.
(C) A judge shall not convey or permit others to convey the impression that
any person or organization is in a position to influence the judge.

Utah Code ofJudicial Conduct, Rule 2.11

RULE2.11
Dist11alifieatio11

(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which
the judge's impartialitytc might reasonably be questioned, including but not
limited to the following circumstances:
(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a
party's lawyer, or personal lmowledge* of facts that are in dispute in the
proceeding.
(2) The judge knows* that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic
partner,* or a person within the third degree of relationship* to either of them,
or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is:
(a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner,
managing member, or trustee of a party;
(b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(c) a person who has more than a de minimis* interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding; or
(d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
(3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary,* or the
judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the
judge's family residing in the judge's household,* has an economic interest*
in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding.
(4) The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party, a
party's lawyer, or the law firm of a party's lawyer has within the previous three
years made aggregate* contributions* to the judge's retention in an amount
that is greater than $50 .
(5) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate,* has made a public
statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that
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commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in
a particular way in the proceeding or controversy.
(6) The judge:
(a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was associated with a
lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such
association;
(b) served in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated
personally and substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the
proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion concerning
the merits of the particular matter in controversy;

(c) was a material witness concerning the matter; or
(d) previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court and is
now acting as a judge who would hear the appeal or trial de novo.
(B) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary
economic interests, and make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the
personal economic interests of the judge's spouse or domestic partner and
minor children residing in the judge's household.

(C) A trial court judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other
than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(1), may disclose on the record
the basis of the judge's disqualification and may ask the parties and their
lawyers to consider, outside the presence of the judge and court personnel,
whether to waive disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties and
lawyers agree, without participation by the judge or court personnel, that the
judge should not be disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding.
The agreement shall be incorporated into the record of the proceeding.
(D) An appellate court judge or justice subject to disqualification under
this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(1), may send
notice to the parties disclosing the basis for the judge or justice's
disqualification and asking them to consider whether to waive
disqualification. With respect to paragraphs (A)(2) or (A)(3), the judge or
justice may participate in the decision of the case if all parties, other than the
party presumably benefitted by the apparent bias constituting the
disqualifying circumstance, waive the disqualification. With respect to
paragraphs (A)(4) through (A)(6), the judge or justice may participate in the
decision of the case if all parties waive the disqualification. The responses to a
notice of a disqualifying circumstance shall be included in the appellate file
pertaining to the proceeding.
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Utah Rule of Evidence 401

Rule 401. Test for Relevant Evidence
Evidenceisrelevantif.

(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence; and

(h) the fact is of consequence in determirung the action.
Utah Rule of Evidence 402
Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise:
•
•
•
•

the United States Constitution;
the Utah Constitution;
a statute; or
rules applicable in courts of this state.

Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.

Utah Rule of Evidence 403
i ,,;,

\WP

Rule 403. Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of
Time, or Other Reasons
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.
Utah Rule of Evidence 404

Rule 404. Character Evidence; Crimes or Other Acts
(a) Character Evidence.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not
admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in
confonnity with the character or trait.
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(2) Exceptions for a Defendant or Victim in a Criminal Case. The
following exceptions apply in a criminal case:

~

(A) a defendant may offer evidence of the defendant's pertinent trait, and
if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to
rebut it;

·~

(B) subject to the limitations in Rule 412, a defendant may offer evidence
of an alleged victim's pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted,
the prosecutor may:
I

(i)

offer evidence to rebut it; and

;~

(ii) offer evidence of the defendant's same trait; and

(C) in a homicide case, the prosecutor may offer evidence of the alleged
victim's trait of peacefulness to rebut evidence that the victim was the
first aggressor.
(3) Exceptions for a Witness. Evidence of a witness's character may be
admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609.

(b)

Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in confonnity with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack
of accident. On request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor
must
(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence
that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial; and

(B) do so before trial, or during trial if the court excuses lack of pretrial
notice on good cause shown.
(c) Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child-Molestation Cases.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

(1) Permitted Uses. In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of
child molestation, ~e court may admit evidence that the defendant
committed any other acts of child molestation to prove a propensity to
commit the crime charged.

(2) Disclosure. If the prosecution intends to offer this evidence it shall
provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court
excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown.
(3) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed in
relation to a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this
state, be a sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense.
(4) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise
admissible under Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence.

Utah Rule of Evidence 801

Rule 801. Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from Hearsay
(a)

Statement. "Statement'' means a person's oral assertion, written assertion, or

nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.

(b)

Declarant. "Declarant'' means the person who made the statement.

(c)

Hearsay. "Hearsay" means a statement that:

(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing;
and
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement

(d)

Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the following

conditions is not hearsay:

(1) A Declarant-Witness's Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is
subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement

(A) is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the declarant denies
having made the statement or has forgotten, or
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(B) is consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an
express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or
acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying; or

(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier.
(2) An Opposing Party's Statement. The statement is offered against an
opposing party and:

(A) was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity;
(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true;

(C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a
statement on the subject;

(D) was made by the party's agent or employee on a matter within the
scope of that relationship and while it existed; or

(E) was made by the party's coconspirator during and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.

Utah Rule of Evidence 802

Rule 802. The Rule Against Hearsay
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules.
Utah Rule ofJuvenile Procedure 22

Rule 22. Initial appearance and preliminary examination in cases under
Section 78A-6-702 and Section 78A-6-703.
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the minor shall appear
before the court as directed in the swnmons.

(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest of a minor without a
warrant, the minor shall be taken to a detention center pending a detention hearing,
which shall be held as provided by these rules. When any peace officer makes an
arrest of a minor with a warrant, the minor shall be taken to the place designated on
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the warrant If an information has not been filed, one shall be filed without delay in
the court with jurisdiction over the offense.
(c) If a minor is arrested in a county other than where the offense was committed
the minor shall without unnecessary delay be returned to the county where the crime
was committed and shall be taken before a judge of the juvenile court.
(d) The court shall, upon the minor's first appearance, infonn the minor:
(d)(1) of the charge in the infonnation or indictment and furnish the minor with a
copy;
(d)(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the information
and how to obtain them;
(d)(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court
without expense if the minor is unable to obtain counsel;
(d.)(4) of rights concerning detention, pretrial release, and bail in the event the
minor is bound over to stand trial in district court; and
(d)(S) that the minor is not required to make any statement, and that any
statements made may be used against the minor in a court of law.
(e) The court shall, after providing the information under paragraph (d) and
before proceeding further, allow the minor reasonable time and opportunity to
consult counsel and shall allow the minor to contact any attorney by any reasonable
means, without delay and without fee.
(t)(1) The minor may not be called on to enter a plea. During the initial
appearance, the minor shall be advised of the right to a preliminary examination and,
as applicable, to a certification hearing pursuant to Section 78A-6-703 or to the right
to present evidence regarding the conditions established by Section 78A-6-702. If the
minor waives the right to a preliminary examination and, if applicable, a certification
hearing, and if the prosecuting attorney consents, the court shall order the minor
bound over to answer in the district court.
(t)(2) If the minor does not waive a preliminary examination, the court shall
schedule the preliminary examination. The time periods of this rule may be extended
by the court for good cause shown. The preliminary examination shall be held within
a reasonable time, but not later than ten days after the initial appearance if the minor
is in custody for the offense charged and the information is filed under Section 78A6-702. The preliminary examination shall be held within a reasonable time, but not
later than 30 days after the initial appearance if:
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(f)(2)(A) the minor is in custody for the offense charged and the infonnation is
filed under Section78A-6-703; or
(f)(2)(B) the minor is not in custody.
(f)(3) A preliminary examination may not be held if the minor is indicted. If the
indictment is filed under 78A-6-703, the court shall proceed in accordance with Rule
23 to hear evidence presented by the prosecutor regarding the factors of Section 78A6-703 for waiver of jurisdiction and certification, unless the hearing is waived. If the
indictment is filed under Section 78A-6-702, the court shall proceed in accordance
with Rule 23A to hear evidence presented by the minor regarding the conditions. of
Section 78A-6-702, if requested.

(g) A preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and laws applicable to
criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden of proof and shall
proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify
under oath, call witnesses, and present evidence. The minor may cross-examine
adverse witnesses.

(h) If from the evidence the court finds probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed and that the minor has committed it, and if the
infonnation is filed under Section 78A-6-703, the court shall proceed in accordance
with Rule 23 to hear evidence presented by the prosecutor regarding the factors of
Section 78A-6-703 for waiver of jurisdiction and certification.

(i) If from the evidence the court finds probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed and that the minor has committed it, and if the
infonnation is filed under Section78A-6-702, the court shall proceed in accordance
with Rule 23A to hear evidence presented by the minor regarding the conditions of
Section 78A-6-702.

G) The finding of probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in part.
Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not
properly raised at the preliminary examination.
(k) If the court does not find probable cause to believe that the crime charged has
been committed or that the minor committed it, the court shall dismiss the
infonnation and discharge the minor. The court may enter findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not
preclude the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
(1) At a preliminary examination, upon request of either party, and subject to Title
77, Chapter 38, Victim Rights, the court may:

(1) (1) exclude witnesses from the courtroom;
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0)(2) require witnesses not to converse with each other until the preliminary
examination is concluded; and
0)(3) exclude spectators from the courtroom.

Utah Rule ofJuvenile Procedure 23A

Rule 23A. Hearing on conditions of Section 78A-6-702; bind over to district
court.
(a) If a criminal indictment under Section 78A-6-702 alleges the commission of a
felony, the court shall, upon the request of the minor, hear evidence and detennine
whether the conditions of paragraph (c) exist

(b) If a criminal infonnation under Section 78A-6-702 alleges the commission of a
felony, after a finding of probable cause in accordance with Rule 22, the court shall
hear evidence and detennine whether the conditions of paragraph (c) exist
(c) The minor shall have the burden of going forward as to the existence of the
following conditions as provided by Section 78A-6-702:
(c)(1) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense
involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an
adult;
(c)(2) that if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, the
minor appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants; and
(c)(3) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a violent,
aggressive, or premeditated manner.
(d) At the conclusion of the minor's case, the state may call witnesses and present
evidence on the conditions required by Section 78A-6-702. The minor may crossexamine adverse witnesses.
(e) If the court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions
required by Section78A-6-702 are present, the court shall enter an order directing the
minor to answer the charges in district court
(f)(1) Upon entry of an order directing the minor to answer the charges in district
court, the court shall comply with the requirements of Title 77, Chapter 20,_ Bail. By
issuance of a warrant of arrest or continuance of an existing warrant, the court may
order the minor committed to jail in accordance with Section 62A-7-201. The court
shall enter the appropriate written order.
(f)(2) The clerk of the juvenile court shall transmit to the clerk of the district court
all pleadings in and records made of the proceedings in the juvenile court

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(f)(3) The jurisdiction of the court shall tenninate as provided by statute.

(g) If the court finds probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed
and that the minor committed it and also finds that all of the conditions of Section
78A-6-702 are present, the court shall proceed upon the infonnation as if it were a
petition. The court may order the minor held in a detention center or released in
accordance with Rule 9.

Utah Rule ofJuvenile Procedure 28

Rule 28. Scheduling of minors' cases.
(a) Proceedings concerning alleged violations of law shall be scheduled and
conducted separately for each minor except as provided hereafter.

(b) Where more than one minor is involved in the same law violation or criminal
episode, and all such minors are apprehended and charged at or about the same time,
proceedings may be consolidated and heard together before the same judge.
However, if any party objects to consolidation on the record or in writing, remaining
proceedings shall be heard separately as to the objecting minor. The court may, for
good cause shown, order that any such separate hearings be held with respect to
disposition whether requested or not.
(c) Proceedings with respect to minors in the same family or household, even when
they do not involve allegations of the same law violations or criminal episode, may be
consolidated unless objected to by any party. In that event, the court shall schedule
separate hearings to protect the interest of the objecting party as appears appropriate.
(d) Where a minor is named in a petition which alleges violations of the law and in a
separate petition alleging other grounds for jurisdiction, such as dependency or
neglect, the petitions may be consolidated.

Utah Rule ofJuvenile Procedure 43

Rule 43. Evidence.
(a) Except as set forth herein or as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court
shall adhere to the Utah Rules of Evidence.

(b) All oral testimony before the court shall be given under oath unless waived by
the parties, and may be narrative in fonn or by stipulated proffer of testimony or as
otherwise provided by these Rules.
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(c) Written notice of the intent to offer a statement under Utah Code Section
78A-6-115(5) must be given to all parties at least five days prior to the adjudication
hearing in which the statement is going to be offered. The court may, upon good
cause shown, waive the requirement for five days notice.

Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.0
RULE 1.0 TERMINOLOGY
(a) ''Belief' or ''believes" denotes that the person involved actually supposed
the fact in question to be true. A person's belief may be inferred from
circumstances.

(b) "Confinned in writing," when used in reference to the infonned
consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the
person or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming
an oral infonned consent. See paragraph (f) for the definition of "informed
consent." If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the
person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it
within a reasonable time thereafter.
(c) "Consult" or "consultation" denotes communication of
infonnation reasonablysufficient to permit the client to appreciate the
significance of the matter in question.
(d) ''Finn" or ''law finn" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership,
professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized
to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the
legal department of a corporation or other organization.
(e) ''Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the
substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose
to deceive.

(£) ''Informed consent" denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed
course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information
and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available
alternatives to the proposed course of conduct
(g) "Knowingly," ''know'' or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in
question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.
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(h) ''Partner" denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law
finnorganized as a professional corporation, or a member of an association
authorized to practice law.

(i) ''Reasonable" or "reasonably" when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer
denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.

G) ''Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes" when used in reference to a
lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the
circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.

(k) ''Reasonably should know'' when used in reference to a lawyer denotes
that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the
matter in question.

(I.) "Screened" denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a
matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that
are reasonablyadequate under the circumstances to protect infonnation that
the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or other_ law.
(m) "Substantial" when used in reference to degree or extent denotes
material matter of clear and weighty importance.

a

(n) ''Tribunal" denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration
proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in
an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other
body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the
presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a
binding legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular
matter.
(o) ''Writing" or "written" denotes a tangible or electronic record of a
communication or representation, including handwriting, typewriting,
printing, photostating, photography, audio or videorecording and e-mail. A
"signed" writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to
or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person
with the intent to sign the writing.
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